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Preface
In recent years, federal courts have tried an increasing number of sus-
pected terrorists. In fact, since 2001, federal courts have convicted over 403 
people for terrorism-related crimes.1 Although much has been written about 
the normative question of where terrorists should be tried, scant research exists 
about the impact these recent trials have had upon the Article III court system. 
The debate, rather, has focused almost exclusively upon the proper venue for 
these trials and the hypothetical problems and advantages that might inhere 
in each venue.
The war in Afghanistan, presenting a host of thorny legal issues,2 is now 
the longest war in United States history.3 This means that the federal courts 
*	 J.D.	Candidate,	Stanford	Law	School,	2011;	B.A.,	Pepperdine	University,	2008.	Prospective	Law	
Clerk	to	the	Honorable	Ruggero	J.	Aldisert,	United	States	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	Third	Circuit,	
2011–2012.	I	am	deeply	grateful	to	Janet	Alexander	for	her	wise	insights,	precise	criticisms,	and	
thoughtful	comments	in	helping	me	to	arrive	at	and	fully	develop	this	topic;	to	Professor	Stephen	
I.	 Vladeck	 for	 his	 invaluable	 and	 path-breaking	 investigative	 research	 into	Abu	Ali’s	 trial,	 for	
which	I	am	enormously	indebted;	to	Sarah	Wedel	and	Lauren	Kulpa	for	their	keen	revisions;	to	
Peter	Conti-Brown	for	his	exhortations	and	guidance;	 to	the	staff	of	 the	Legislation	and	Policy	
Brief	for	their	sharp	editorial	refinements;	to	my	family	for	their	support;	and	to	my	wife	for	her	
unwavering	love	and	patience.
1.	 Nat’l Security Division, Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism and 
Terrorism Related Convictions 9/11/01–3/18/10 (2010).	This	report	also	includes	a	list	of	all	
Category	I	and	Category	II	criminal	statutes	under	which	prosecutors	successfully	charged	these	
403	terrorists.	
2.	 See	Al-Bihani	v.	Obama,	590	F.3d	866,	882	(D.C.	Cir.	2010)	(Brown,	J.,	concurring)	(noting	that	
“[t]he	 legal	 issues	presented	by	our	nation’s	fight	with	 this	enemy	have	been	numerous,	diffi-
cult,	and	to	a	 large	extent	novel.	What	drives	 these	 issues	 is	 the	unconventional	nature	of	our	
enemy:	they	are	neither	soldiers	nor	mere	criminals,	claim	no	national	affiliation,	and	adopt	long-
term	strategies	and	asymmetric	tactics	that	exploit	the	rules	of	open	societies	without	respect	or	
reciprocity.”).
3.	 See Rick	Hampson,	Afghanistan: America’s Longest War,	USA Today, May	28,	2010,	at	A1.
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have never endured wartime conditions for so long. As a result of this pro-
longed martial influence, it is clear that this war is corroding federal court 
jurisprudence. My research represents a first attempt at synthesizing what 
impact the war in general, and terror trials in particular, have had upon the 
federal courts. I argue that the hypothetical fear of “seepage” has become con-
crete. Indeed, judges already admit that the war has taken a regrettable toll on 
courts’ opinions.4
In a trend that should alarm both tribunal proponents and detractors alike, 
tribunals and criminal trials are gradually growing to resemble one another. 
While efforts to improve the military tribunal system have enjoyed a fair level 
of success,5 long-entrenched Article III standards are deteriorating at a pace 
that mirrors the pace of tribunals’ improvements. A cluster of recent cases, 
proposed bills, and regulatory actions have narrowed the gap between Article 
III courts and military tribunals considerably. When viewed as a whole, these 
blurred lines between the military and domestic spheres draw the federal courts 
into disquieting congruity with the tribunal system.
I argue that these decisions and bills have altered (1) habeas jurisprudence, 
(2) detention policy, and (3) criminal investigatory procedure. More specifi-
cally, I contend that, as a result of a decade of federal courts accommodat-
ing the government’s campaign against terror, the criminal justice system is 
beginning to resemble the very military tribunals that were once the antithesis 
of Article III courts. In Part II, I discuss how the federal judiciary’s perspec-
tive on habeas corpus review has shifted dramatically even since the beginning 
of the global war on terror. In Part III, I argue that recent court decisions and 
administrative agency actions have created an Article III-sanctioned indefinite 
detention system that is almost indistinguishable from Guantánamo Bay. In 
Part IV, I observe that courts have relaxed their threshold evidentiary require-
ments to a point that is strikingly similar to those of military tribunals. In 
short, courts are becoming military commissions that convict.
4.	 See,	e.g.,	Al-Bihani,	590	F.3d	at	882	(“This	war	has	placed	us	not	just	at,	but	already	past	the	lead-
ing	edge	of	a	new	and	frightening	paradigm,	one	that	demands	new	rules	be	written.	Falling	back	
on	the	comfort	of	prior	practices	supplies	only	illusory	comfort.”).
5.	 See David	S.	Cloud	&	Julian	E.	Barnes,	New Rules on Terror Custody Being Drafted,	L.A. Times,	
Apr.	16,	2010,	at	A1	(“The	Obama	administration	is	for	the	first	time	drafting	classified	guidelines	
to	help	the	government	determine	whether	newly	captured	terrorism	suspects	will	be	prosecuted	
or	held	indefinitely	without	trial	.	.	.	.”).
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I. IntroductIon
There	exists	an	ongoing	debate	about	where	to	detain	and	how	to	
try	 alleged	 terrorists.6	After	 the	 events	 of	 September	 11,	 2001,	 politi-
cians	and	scholars	alike	grappled	with	an	array	of	questions	posed	by	
the	 novel	 circumstances	 facing	America.	 It	 was	 not	 readily	 apparent	
whether	America	was	“at	war.”	As	a	result,	it	was	unclear	how	best	to	
characterize	America’s	enemies.	The	most	difficult	question	 this	 lack	
of	clarity	presented	was	a	simple	issue	of	venue:	should	suspected	ter-
rorists	be	tried	as	criminals	in	a	federal	court	or	as	quasi-soldiers	in	a	
military	tribunal?	For	the	last	decade,	the	answer	to	that	question	has	
been	 “both.”	 The	 United	 States	 has	 tried	 and	 convicted	 terrorists	 in	
both	federal	courts	and	in	military	tribunals	for	similar	bad	acts.
Maintaining	 these	 two	 justice	 systems	 is,	 by	 any	 measure,	 a	
Sisyphean	 labor.	 Although	 both	 aim	 ostensibly	 to	 achieve	 the	 same	
retributive,	 punitive,	 and	 protective	 goals,	 the	 two	 systems	 were	
intended	to	be	very	different.7	Such	differences	are	necessary,	tribunal	
supporters	argue,	because	tribunals	are	a	military	venture	designed	to	
be	entirely	distinct	from	Article	III	courts.8	Military	tribunals	—	and	the	
detention	centers	holding	future	 tribunal	defendants	at	Guantánamo	
Bay,	 Bagram	 Air	 Force	 Base	 in	 Afghanistan,	 and	 elsewhere	 —	 are	
tailored	 to	 the	 exigent	 needs	 of	 a	 martial	 judicial	 system	 that	 exists	
entirely	outside	the	Article	III	court	system.	For	both	supporters	and	
detractors	of	the	tribunal	system,	the	differences	between	the	two	sys-
tems	are	precisely	what	drive	the	debate	about	military	tribunals.	For	
supporters,	tribunals’	deviations	from	Article	III	norms	afford	the	gov-
ernment	 sufficient	 flexibility	 to	 employ	 evidentiary	 procedures	 and	
retributive	measures	otherwise	unavailable	in	a	federal	court	setting.9	
America’s	“war”	against	terror,	the	argument	goes,	necessitates	a	sys-
tem	constructed	outside	Article	III	standards.	For	tribunal	opponents	
6.	 See, e.g., Bruce	Ackerman,	The Emergency Constitution,	113	Yale L.J. 1029	(2004);	Janet	Cooper	
Alexander,	Jurisdiction Stripping in a Time of Terror,	95	Cal. L. Rev. 1193	(2007);	Curtis	A.	Bradley	
&	Jack	L.	Goldsmith,	Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,	118	Harv. L. Rev. 2047	
(2005);	David	Cole,	Enemy Aliens,	54 Stan L. Rev. 953	(2002);	Neal	Katyal	&	Laurence	H.	Tribe,	
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals,	111	Yale L.J. 1259	(2002);	Charlie	Savage,	
Obama Team Split on Tactics Against Terror,	N.Y. Times,	Mar.	29,	2010,	at	A1;	Charlie	Savage	&	Scott	
Shane,	Experts Urge Keeping Both Civilian and Military Options in Terror Trials,	N.Y. Times,	Mar.	9,	
2010,	at	A15.
7.	 See, e.g., Memorandum	from	Brad	Wiegmann	&	Mark	Martins,	Detention	Policy	Task	Force,	to	
the	Attorney	General	&	Secretary	of	Defense	(July	29,	2009)	(on	file	with	Brief),	available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/documents/preliminary-rpt-dptf-072009.pdf,	(“Military	commissions	that	
take	into	account	these	concerns	are	necessarily	somewhat	different	than	our	federal	courts,	but	
no	less	legitimate.”).
8.	 See id.
9.	 See, e.g.,	John	Yoo,	Courts at War,	91	Cornell L. Rev. 573,	574	(2006)	(“The	days	when	society	
considered	terrorism	merely	a	law	enforcement	problem	and	when	our	forces	against	terrorism	
were	limited	to	the	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation,	federal	prosecutors,	and	the	criminal	justice	
system	will	not	return.”).
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who	 believe	 that	Article	 III	 courts	 should	 try	 terrorists	 as	 criminals,	
however,	 the	methods	and	procedures	used	 to	maintain	 the	 tribunal	
system	are	unnecessary	and	constitutionally	offensive.
Tribunal	opponents	have	 long	argued	 that	military	 tribunals	suf-
fer	 from	 severe	 constitutional	 infirmities.10	 Despite	 recent	 tribunal	
improvements,11	this	remains	painfully	true,12	especially	since	the	gov-
ernment	has	not	yet	 found	an	administrable	way	 to	determine	what	
types	of	terrorists	belong	in	a	tribunal	system.13	In	response,	these	tri-
10.	 See, e.g.,	David	Glazier,	A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over the Guantánamo 
Military Commissions,	12	Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 131, 201 (2008) (“The	United	States’	post-9/11	
implementation	of	military	commission	trials	has	been	a	national	embarrassment,	adversely	im-
pacting	the	country’s	standing	in	world	public	opinion	while	doing	nothing	to	improve	national	
security.”).
11.	 See Military	Commissions	Act	of	2009,	10	U.S.C.A.	§§	948–950	(2009);	see also Joanne	Mariner,	
A First Look at the Military Commissions Act of 2009, Part Two,	FindLaw’s Writ	 (Nov.	30,	2009),	
http://writ.news.	findlaw.com/mariner/20091130.html.	The	Military	Commissions	Act	of	2009	
improves	upon	the	2006	version	in	several	notable	ways.	The	2009	Act	refines	the	definition	of	
America’s	present	conflict	to	encompass	the	expanded	scope	of	military	actions	against	Al	Qaeda,	
Taliban,	and	other	associated	groups.	See §	948a(7).	It	bars	statements	made	as	a	result	of	cruel,	
inhuman,	or	degrading	treatment.	See §	948r.	With	regard	to	admissible	evidence,	 it	 requires	a	
military	judge	to	examine	the	“totality	of	the	circumstances”	in	deciding	whether	evidence	would	
impact	the	defendant	unfairly.	See	 §	948r(d)(3)	(defining	these	circumstances	to	 include	“[t]he	
lapse	of	 time,	 change	of	place,	or	 change	 in	 identity	of	 the	questioners	between	 the	statement	
sought	to	be	admitted	and	any	prior	questioning	of	the	accused”).	Finally,	it	vastly	augments	de-
fense	resources	in	response	to	vocal	concerns	about	the	2006	Act.	See §	948k.	In	addition,	the	2009	
Act	remedies	the	2006	version’s	bold	statement	that	Geneva	Conventions	could	not	be	invoked	as	
a	source	of	rights.	See Military	Commissions	Act	of	2006,	10	U.S.C.	§	948b(g)	(2006).
12.	 See Editorial,	Tainted Justice,	N.Y. Times,	May	24,	2010,	at	A24	(“If	the	Obama	administration	
wants	to	demonstrate	that	it	is	practical	and	just	to	try	some	terrorism	suspects	in	military	tribu-
nals	instead	of	federal	courts,	it	is	off	to	a	very	poor	start.”).	Indeed,	the	2009	Military	Commissions	
Act,	like	its	predecessor,	grants	unprecedented	jurisdiction	to	military	commissions.	It	mirrors	the	
language	from	the	2006	Act	granting	commissions	jurisdiction	to	try	defendants	for	“purposeful	
and	material	support”	of	terrorism.	This	muscular	jurisdictional	grant	led	the	Solicitor	General’s	
office	to	argue	that	a	“little	old	lady	in	Switzerland	who	writes	checks	to	what	she	thinks	is	a	char-
ity	that	helps	orphans	in	Afghanistan,”	an	English	teacher	with	an	al-Qaeda-affiliated	pupil,	and	
a	journalist	who	refuses	to	disclose	information	about	Osama	bin	Laden’s	whereabouts	to	protect	
her	sources	would	all	be	subject	to	trial	by	tribunal.	See In re Guantánamo	Detainee	Cases,	355	F.	
Supp.	2d	443,	475	(D.D.C.	2005)	(quoting	transcript	from	oral	argument).	In	the	course	of	litiga-
tion,	however,	President	Obama’s	Department	of	Justice	has	utilized	a	marginally	more	nuanced	
approach	 when	 prosecuting	 terrorism	 supporters	 versus	 terrorism	 perpetrators.	Although	 the	
language	remains	unchanged,	it	appears	that	the	Department	of	Justice	has	conceded	its	inability	
to	 maintain	 a	 classification	 broad	 enough	 to	 covers	 jihadists	 in	Afghanistan	 along	 with	 Swiss	
grandmothers.
13.	 White	House	officials	have	admitted	 that	 the	Administration’s	uncertainty	about	 the	conse-
quences	of	capturing	alleged	Al	Qaeda	operative	Saleh	Ali	Saleh	led	the	White	House	to	order	his	
assassination	rather	than	capture	him	alive.	See	David	Cloud	&	Julian	Barnes,	U.S. May Expand 
Use of its Afghan Prisons,	L.A. Times,	Mar.	21,	2010,	at	A1;	cf. Goldberg	v.	Kelly,	397	U.S.	254,	278-79	
(1970)	(Black,	J.,	dissenting).	In	Goldberg,	Justice	Black	laments	in	his	dissent	that	perverse	results	
will	often	be	obtained	in	systems	that	produce	uncertain	outcomes:	“The	Court	apparently	feels	
that	this	decision	will	benefit	the	poor	and	needy.	In	my	judgment	the	eventual	result	will	be	just	
the	opposite.	.	.	.	While	this	Court	will	perhaps	have	insured	that	no	needy	person	will	be	taken	
off	the	rolls	.	.	.it	will	also	have	insured	that	many	will	never	get	on	the	rolls,	or	at	least	that	they	
will	remain	destitute	during	the	lengthy	proceedings	followed	to	determine	initial	eligibility.” Id. 
Similarly,	by	maintaining	such	an	extensive	“menu”	of	options	for	captured	terror	suspects,	the	
government	may	insure	that	it	will	find	some	way	to	prosecute	or	punish	captives	once	caught.	
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bunal	opponents	posit	 that	 the	surest	way	 to	 remedy	 tribunals’	 con-
stitutional	 failings	 would	 be	 to	 abolish	 the	 system	 and	 try	 terrorists	
as	criminals	 in	Article	 III	 courts.14	While	 the	 tribunal	 system	has	not	
been	abolished,	it	has	certainly	languished	in	desuetude,	bringing	just	
three	detainees	to	trial.15	More	tribunals	are	planned,16	but	notions	that	
those	plans	will	come	to	fruition	remain	dubious.	Conversely,	between	
September	11,	2001,	and	March	18,	2010,	federal	courts	convicted	403	
people	 for	 terror-related	crimes.17	 In	 late	2009,	Attorney	General	Eric	
Holder	declared	that	future	terrorist	suspects	would	be	presumed	eli-
gible	for	trial	in	federal	court.18	Moreover,	regardless	whether	military	
commissions	are	wise	or	even	administrable,	 they	cannot	be	used	 in	
many	circumstances.	Although	instances	of	terror	plots	have	reached	
an	all-time	high,19	most	of	the	recent	plotters	have	been	United	States	
or	British	citizens.20	Americans,	however,	are	precluded	from	military	
tribunal	 trials,21	and	British	citizens	are	practically	barred	from	them	
for	diplomatic	reasons.22	Therefore,	it	appears	that	the	majority	of	con-
temporary	terrorists	will	be	tried	in	Article	III	courts.
The	greater	amount	of	process	needed	to	make	such	a	determination,	however,	will	insure	simi-
larly	 that	 the	 government	 will	 assassinate,	 rather	 than	 capture,	 many	 terror	 suspects,	 like	Ali	
Saleh,	whose	fate	is	harder	to	predict.
14.	 See, e.g.,	 Military Commissions Shouldn’t Be Used; Pentagon Rules Shortchange Justice,	 Human 
Rights Watch	(June	25,	2003),	http://hrw.org/	english/docs/2003/06/25/usdom6178_txt.htm.
15.	 Of	 these	trials,	all	have	suffered	from	severe	 idiosyncratic	defects.	See	David	Glazier,	A Self-
Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over the Guantánamo Military Commissions,	12	Lewis 
& Clark L. Rev. 131	(2008).	
16.	 Military Commissions,	U.S. Dep’t of Def,	http://www.defense.gov/	news/commissions.html	
(last	visited	Sept.	27,	2010)	(listing	names	of	proposed	commissions	cases).
17.	 See Nat’l	Sec.	Div.,	supra	note	1	and	accompanying	text.	
18.	 See	Editorial,	The K.S.M. Files,	N.Y. Times, Apr.	15,	2010,	at	A26.	Despite	this	presumption,	this	
debate	is	far	from	over.	There	are	several	bills	pending	in	Congress	that	would	strip	Article	III	
courts	of	jurisdiction	and	funding	to	hear	terror	cases.	See infra	notes	133-140.
19.	 See, e.g.,	Daniel	Byman,	Coming to America: We’re Likely to See More Attacks on U.S. Soil by Al-
Qaida Affiliates,	 Slate	 (May	 5,	 2010),	 http://www.slate.com/id/2253051	 (“[O]ne	 thing	 seems	
clear:	There	is	a	growing	danger	of	attacks	on	U.S.	soil	by	groups	affiliated	with,	but	not	formally	
part	 of,	 al-Qaida.”);	 Timothy	 Noah,	 Why Now?,	 Slate	 (May	 4,	 2010),	 http://www.slate.com/
id/2252905	(noting	that	recently	foiled	terror	attempts	by	“Zazi,	Abdulmutallab,	and	Shahzad	are	
probably	more	than	just	a	statistically	quirky	cluster.	They	constitute	circumstantial	but	compel-
ling	evidence	that	al-Qaida	has	stepped	up	its	efforts	to	attack	the	United	States	in	response	to	a	
perceived	or	real	lowering	of	our	guard.”).
20.	 See Paul	Cruickshank,	Homecoming,	Newsweek,	Sept.	29,	2009,	http://www.newsweek.com/
id/216472.	According	to	Cruickshank,	“Twenty	years	after	Al	Qaeda	was	founded,	an	average	of	
about	one	American	resident	had	joined	its	ranks	every	two	years.	Suddenly,	though,	in	the	spring	
of	2008,	this	slow	trickle	became	a	flood.	In	the	past	18	months,	at	least	a	half	dozen	recruits	may	
have	trained	with	Al	Qaeda	.	.	.	.	The	American	dream	alone	may	not	be	enough	to	stop	young-
sters	from	being	attracted	into	Al	Qaeda’s	ranks.	British	cases	have	shown	that,	as	often	as	not,	
it	is	university-educated,	middle-class,	Mercedes-driving	youngsters	that	plot	terrorist	attacks.” 
Id. See also	Raffi	Khatchadourian,	Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qaeda Homegrown,	New 
Yorker, Jan.	22,	2007,	at	50.
21.	 See 10	U.S.C.A.	§	948c	(2009)	(“Any	alien	unprivileged	enemy	belligerent	is	subject	to	trial	by	
military	commission	as	set	forth	in	this	chapter.”).	
22.	 See Glazier,	supra	note	10,	at	156–58	(recording	how	Britain	refuses	to	allow	its	citizens	to	be	
tried	in	tribunals).
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This	debate	about	whether	Article	III	courts	are	indeed	superior	to	
tribunals	is	quickly	becoming	moot.	Proponents	of	Article	III	trials	fate-
fully	assumed	that	federal	courts	would	adhere	to	procedural	and	con-
stitutional	 guidelines	 unwaveringly,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 arbitrary	 and	
subjective	“kangaroo	courts”	of	the	tribunal	system.23	If	this	assump-
tion	were	true,	Article	III	courts’	heavy	terrorism	caseload	would	seem	
to	 signal	 victory	 for	 federal	 court	 proponents.	 But	 simply	 hearing	 a	
large	number	of	terror	cases	in	federal	courts	was	never	meant	to	be	an	
end	in	itself:	Article	III	terror	trials	were	but	a	means	to	secure	the	con-
stitutional	protections	that	military	tribunals	lacked.	If,	in	trying	terror-
ists,	Article	III	courts	succumbed	to	the	same	pressures	that	crippled	
tribunals,	holding	terror	trials	in	federal	courts	would	be	no	victory	at	
all.
In	a	trend	that	should	alarm	both	tribunal	proponents	and	detrac-
tors	alike,	these	once-antagonistic	systems	are	becoming	twins.	While	
efforts	to	improve	the	military	tribunal	system	to	match	constitutional	
and	 international	 legal	 norms	 have	 enjoyed	 a	 fair	 level	 of	 success,24	
long-entrenched	Article	 III	 standards	are	deteriorating	at	a	pace	 that	
mirrors	the	pace	of	tribunals’	improvements.	A	cluster	of	recent	cases,	
proposed	bills,	and	regulatory	actions	have	narrowed	the	gap	between	
Article	III	courts	and	military	tribunals	considerably.	When	viewed	as	
a	whole,	these	blurred	lines	between	the	military	and	domestic	spheres	
draw	 the	 federal	 courts	 into	 disquieting	 congruity	 with	 the	 tribunal	
system.	Specifically,	 these	decisions	and	bills	have	altered	 (1)	habeas	
jurisprudence,	(2)	detention	policy,	and	(3)	criminal	investigatory	pro-
cedure	 in	ways	 that	 suggest	a	disturbing	 trend.	This	 trend	suggests,	
in	turn,	that	so	long	as	there	remains	a	pressure	to	convict	and	perma-
nently	incapacitate	alleged	terrorists	—	or,	to	state	the	contrapositive,	
so	long	as	there	exists	trepidation	about	releasing	alleged	terrorists	for	
fear	that	they	may	be	still	dangerous	—	no	court	system	will	be	immune	
from	the	invariably	pervasive	effects	of	such	pressure.
23.	 See, e.g.,	David	Glazier,	Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21st-Century Military 
Commission,	89	Va. L. Rev. 2005 (2003) (arguing	that	military	tribunals	may	need	additional	due	
process	safeguards).
24.	 See David	S.	Cloud	&	Julian	E.	Barnes,	New Rules on Terror Custody Being Drafted,	L.A. Times,	
Apr.	15,	2010,	at	A1	(“The	Obama	administration	is	for	the	first	time	drafting	classified	guidelines	
to	help	the	government	determine	whether	newly	captured	terrorism	suspects	will	be	prosecuted	
or	held	indefinitely	without	trial.”);	see also Wiegmann	&	Martins,	supra note	7,	at	3	(“On	May	15,	
the	Administration	announced	five	rule	changes	.	.	.	as	a	first	step	toward	meaningful	reform	of	
the	commissions	established	by	the	MCA.”).
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Wars	have	a	corrosive	effect	on	courts.	Many	of	the	darkest	moments	
in	federal	 jurisprudential	history	have	resulted	from	wartime	cases.25	
This	is	because,	“[i]n	an	idealized	view,	our	judicial	system	is	insulated	
from	the	ribald	passions	of	politics.	[But]	in	reality,	those	passions	suf-
fuse	the	criminal	justice	system.”26	Wars	especially	tend	to	excite	pas-
sions	to	a	fever	pitch.	As	the	D.C.	Circuit	has	lamented,
[t]he	common	law	process	depends	on	incrementalism	
and	eventual	correction,	and	it	is	most	effective	where	
there	are	a	significant	number	of	cases	brought	before	
a	large	set	of	courts,	which	in	turn	enjoy	the	luxury	of	
time	to	work	the	doctrine	supple.	None	of	those	factors	
exist	 in	 the	Guantánamo	context.	 .	 .	 .	 [I]n	the	midst	of	
an	ongoing	war,	time	to	entertain	a	process	of	trial	and	
error	is	not	a	luxury	we	have.27
The	war	in	Afghanistan,	presenting	a	host	of	thorny	legal	issues,28	
is	now	the	longest	war	in	United	States	history.29	This	means	that	the	
federal	courts	have	never	endured	wartime	conditions	for	so	long.	As	a	
result	of	this	prolonged	martial	influence,	it	is	clear	that	this	war	is	cor-
roding	 federal	 court	 jurisprudence.	Court-watchers	have	 long	 feared	
the	danger	of	“seepage”	—	the	notion	that,	 if	 terrorists	were	tried	in	
Article	 III	 courts,	 the	 pressure	 to	 convict	 would	 spur	 the	 creation	 of	
bad	law	that	would	“seep”	into	future	non-terror	trials.30	In	this	Note,	
I	 argue	 that	 this	 hypothetical	 fear	 of	 seepage	 has	 become	 concrete.	
Indeed,	judges	already	admit	that	the	war	has	taken	a	regrettable	toll	
on	courts’	opinions.	In	Al-Bihani v. Obama,31	a	recent	D.C.	Circuit	deci-
sion	about	Guantánamo	detention,	habeas	corpus	review,	and	criminal	
procedure,	 the	 opinion’s	 author	 admits	 how	 the	 courts	 have	 bent	 to	
accommodate	the	pressures	of	war:
25.	 See, e.g.,	Ex parte Quirin,	317	U.S.	1	(1942)	(which	upheld	the	jurisdiction	of	a	United	States	mili-
tary	tribunal	over	the	trial	of	several	Operation	Pastorius	German	saboteurs	in	the	United	States).
26.	 David	Feige,	The Real Price of Trying KSM: Defense Lawyers Will Inevitably Create Bad Law,	Slate	
(Nov.	19,	2009),	
27.	 Al-Bihani	v.	Obama,	590	F.3d	866,	881–82	(D.C.	Cir.	2010)	(Brown,	J.,	concurring).
28.	 See, e.g.,	Al-Bihani,	590	F.3d	at	881–82	 (Brown,	 J.,	concurring)	 (noting	that	“[t]he	 legal	 issues	
presented	by	our	nation’s	fight	with	 this	enemy	have	been	numerous,	difficult,	 and	 to	a	 large	
extent	novel.	What	drives	these	issues	is	the	unconventional	nature	of	our	enemy:	they	are	nei-
ther	soldiers	not	mere	criminals,	claim	no	national	affiliation,	and	adopt	long-term	strategies	and	
asymmetric	tactics	that	exploit	the	rules	of	open	societies	without	respect	or	reciprocity.”).
29.	 See Rick	Hampson,	Afghanistan: America’s Longest War,	USA Today, May	28,	2010,	at	A1.
30.	 See, e.g.,	David	Feige,	The Real Price of Trying KSM: Defense Lawyers Will Inevitably Create Bad Law,	
Slate	(Nov.	19,	2009),	http://www.slate.com/	id/2236146	(“Ever	deferential	to	the	trial	court,	the	
U.S.	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	Second	Circuit	will	affirm	dozens	of	decisions	that	redact	and	re-
strict	the	disclosure	of	secret	documents,	prompting	the	government	to	be	ever	more	expansive	in	
invoking	claims	of	national	security	and	emboldening	other	judges	to	withhold	critical	evidence	
from	future	defendants.”).
31.	 See Al-Bihani,	590	F.3d	866.
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War	 is	 a	 challenge	 to	 law,	and	 the	 law	must	adjust.	 It	
must	recognize	that	 the	old	wineskins	of	 international	
law,	domestic	criminal	procedures,	or	other	prior	frame-
works	are	ill-suited	to	the	bitter	wine	of	this	new	war-
fare.	We	can	no	 longer	afford	diffidence.	This	war	has	
placed	us	not	just	at,	but	already	past	the	leading	edge	
of	a	new	and	frightening	paradigm,	one	that	demands	
new	 rules	 be	 written.	 Falling	 back	 on	 the	 comfort	 of	
prior	practices	supplies	only	illusory	comfort.32
In	this	Note,	I	argue	that	courts	have	already	begun	to	heed	Judge	
Brown’s	advice	and	are	writing	new	rules	in	three	key	areas	of	crimi-
nal	justice.	More	specifically,	I	contend	that,	as	a	result	of	a	decade	of	
federal	courts	accommodating	the	government’s	campaign	against	ter-
ror,	the	criminal	justice	system	is	beginning	to	resemble	the	very	mili-
tary	tribunals	that	once	were	the	antithesis	of	Article	III	courts.	In	Part	
II,	I	discuss	how	the	federal	judiciary’s	perspective	on	habeas	corpus	
review	has	shifted	dramatically	even	since	the	beginning	of	the	global	
war	on	terror.	In	Part	III,	I	argue	that	recent	court	decisions	and	admin-
istrative	agency	action	have	created	an	Article	III-sanctioned	indefinite	
detention	 system	 that	 is	 almost	 indistinguishable	 from	 Guantánamo	
Bay.	In	Part	IV,	I	observe	that	courts	have	relaxed	their	threshold	evi-
dentiary	requirements	 to	a	point	 that	 is	strikingly	similar	 to	 those	of	
military	tribunals.	In	short,	courts	are	becoming	military	commissions	
that	convict.
These	developments	should	cause	all	sides	to	pause	and	reevalu-
ate	the	ends	they	seek.	The	normative	question	about	where	terrorists	
should	be	tried	should	only	be	answered	after	assessing	what	effects	
those	 trials	 will	 have	 on	 the	 system	 in	 which	 they	 take	 place.	 For,	
although	terrorism	caused	the	changes	in	the	three	areas	that	I	high-
light,	these	changes	will	have	impacts	that	outlast	and	reach	far	beyond	
the	current	era	of	terrorism.
II. Habeas Corpus and tHe suspensIon Clause
Much	 of	 the	 federal	 courts’	 terror	 jurisprudence	 from	 the	 past	
decade	focuses	on	the	writ	of	habeas	corpus.	Prior	to	9/11,	issues	sur-
rounding	 false	 imprisonment	 and	 the	 death	 penalty	 largely	 shaped	
habeas	case	 law.	Since	2001,	however,	 the	most	seminal	habeas	cases	
have	dealt	with	terror	and	executive	detention.	This	decade-long	pres-
sure	 on	 courts	 to	 conform	 habeas	 jurisprudence	 to	 the	 exigencies	 of	
wartime	 has	 all	 but	 emasculated	 the	 Great	 Writ.	 Congress	 has	 twice	
32.	 Id. at	882	(Brown,	J.,	concurring).
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attempted	to	strip	the	courts	of	habeas	jurisdiction,33	and	the	Supreme	
Court	has	twice	rebuffed	such	attempts	at	categorical	preclusion.34
Courts’	resistance	to	the	Executive	branch’s	broad	discretion	in	its	
detention	decisions	has	deteriorated.	In	fact,	since	the	Supreme	Court’s	
decision	in	Boumediene,	lower	courts	have	distorted	significantly	both	
who	may	invoke	the	writ	and	what procedures ensue	if	review	is	available.
Boumediene,	 and	 Hamdan and Rasul v. Bush35	 before	 it,	 were	 fact-
heavy	opinions.	But	the	principle	underlying	all	three	seemed	clear:	the	
extraterritoriality	of	an	inmate’s	capture	and	detention	does	not	fore-
close	habeas	review.	At	oral	argument	in	Boumediene,	for	example,	the	
government	insisted	that	Eisentrager	stood	for	the	principle	that	habeas	
corpus	—	and,	with	that,	the	privilege	of	regular	criminal	process	—	does	
not	extend	to	enemy	aliens	captured	abroad	and	detained	abroad.36	The	
Court	rejected	this	formalistic	reading	of	Eisentrager	as	being	at	odds	
with	its	historically	more	functional	approach	to	habeas	jurisdiction.37	
Instead,	the	Court	laid	out	a	tripartite	test	for	whether	habeas	review	
would	be	available.	Habeas	review	will	depend	upon	“(1)	the	citizen-
ship	and	status	of	the	detainee	and	the	adequacy	of	the	process	through	
which	that	status	determination	was	made;	(2)	the	nature	of	the	sites	
where	apprehension	and	then	detention	took	place;	and	(3)	the	prac-
tical	 obstacles	 inherent	 in	 resolving	 the	 prisoner’s	 entitlement	 to	 the	
writ.”38	In	the	case	of	the	Boumediene petitioners,	the	Court	found	that
33.	 See Detainee	Treatment	Act	of	2005,	Pub.	L.	No.	109–148,	119	Stat.	2739,	2742	 (2005)	 (stating	
that	“no	court,	justice,	or	judge	shall	have	jurisdiction	to	hear	or	consider	(1)	an	application	for	a	
writ	of	habeas	corpus	filed	by	or	on	behalf	of	an	alien	detained	by	the	Department	of	Defense	at	
Guantánamo	Bay,	Cuba;	or	(2)	any	other	action	against	the	United	States	or	its	agents	relating	to	
any	aspect	of	the	detention	by	the	Department	of	Defense	of	an	alien	at	Guantánamo	Bay,	Cuba,	
who	(A)	is	currently	in	military	custody;	or	(B)	has	been	determined	.	.	.	to	have	been	properly	
detained	as	an	enemy	combatant”). Later,	in	response	to	the	Supreme	Court’s	ruling	in	Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld,	548	U.S.	557	(2006),	Congress	passed	the	Military	Commissions	Act	of	2006,	Pub.	L.	
No.	109-366,	120	Stat.	2600,	2636	(2006),	which	stated:	“(1)	No	court,	justice,	or	judge	shall	have	
jurisdiction	to	hear	or	consider	an	application	for	a	writ	of	habeas	corpus	filed	by	or	on	behalf	of	
an	alien	detained	by	the	United	States	who	has	been	determined	.	.	.	to	have	been	properly	de-
tained	as	an	enemy	combatant	or	is	awaiting	such	determination.	(2)	[N]o	court,	justice,	or	judge	
shall	have	jurisdiction	to	hear	or	consider	any	other	action	against	the	United	States	or	its	agents	
relating	to	any	aspect	of	the	detention,	transfer,	treatment,	trial,	or	conditions	of	confinement	of	an	
alien	who	is	or	was	detained	by	the	United	States	and	has	been	determined	.	.	.	to	have	been	prop-
erly	detained	as	an	enemy	combatant	or	is	awaiting	such	determination.”	For	an	excellent	discus-
sion	of	Congress’s	attempts	 to	strip	habeas	 jurisdiction	from	the	 federal	courts,	see	Alexander,	
supra note	6.	
34.	 See Boumediene	v.	Bush,	128	S.	Ct.	2229	(2008);	Hamdan,	548	U.S.	557.	
35.	 542	U.S.	466	(2004).
36.	 See Michael John Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., RL 34536, Boumediene v. Bush: 
Guantánamo Detainees’ Right to Habeas Corpus	4	(2008).	See also	Johnson	v.	Eisentrager,	339	
U.S.	763	(1950).
37.	 See Boumediene,	553	U.S.	at	758–64;	see also Reid	v.	Covert,	354	U.S.	1,	74–75	(1957)	(Harlan,	J.,	
concurring)	(opining	that	the	Constitution’s	extraterritoriality	is	contingent	upon	“particular	cir-
cumstances,”	“practical	necessities,”	“possible	alternatives	which	Congress	before	it,”	and	upon	
whether	doing	so	would	be	“impracticable	and	anomalous.”).
38.	 Boumediene,	128	S.	Ct.	at	2259.
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(1)	 the	petitioners	were	non-citizen,	enemy	aliens	subject	 to	an	 inad-
equate	determination	process;39	(2)	they	were	detained	at	a	location	—	
Guantánamo	Bay	—	subject	to	de facto	United	States	sovereignty;40	and	
(3)	their	habeas	review	would	present	no	“threat”	to	the	United	States’	
war	efforts.41	Thus,	the	Court	permitted	habeas	review.
Post-Boumediene,	it	was	unclear	to	what	extent	lower	courts	would	
extend	its	holding	beyond	its	specific	facts.	But	after	a	pair	of	recent	
D.C.	 Circuit	 opinions,	 Al-Bihani v. Obama42	 and	 Al Maqaleh v. Gates,43	
it	 seems	 that	 Boumediene’s	 facts	 mark	 the	 outermost	 bounds	 of	 the	
Suspension	 Clause’s	 reach.	 Indeed,	 post-Al-Bihani and	 -Al Maqaleh,	
an	enervated	Suspension	Clause	will	not	extend	beyond	Guantánamo	
Bay.	This	is	especially	important	because	both	Al-Bihani	and	Al Maqaleh	
garnered	 unanimous	 opinions	 from	 the	 D.C.	 Circuit.44	 Given	 Justice	
Stevens’	recent	retirement,	the	Supreme	Court	is	losing	its	Boumediene	
architect.	Moreover,	Justice	Elena	Kagan,	Justice	Stevens’s	replacement,	
will	likely	need	to	recuse	herself	from	reviewing	both	cases	based	on	
her	involvement	with	them	while	she	served	as	solicitor	general.	Thus,	
even	if	the	Supreme	Court	granted	certiorari,	 the	most	probable	out-
come	would	be	a	4–4	affirmance	of	the	D.C.	Circuit.	Al-Bihani	and	Al 
Maqaleh will	 therefore	stand	as	 the	most	authoritative	 rulings	on	 the	
Suspension	Clause	for	the	foreseeable	future.
In	 Al-Bihani,	 the	 petitioner	 was	 a	 Yemeni	 citizen	 imprisoned	 at	
Guantánamo	Bay	since	2002.	He	contested	the	lawfulness	of	his	deten-
tion	and	alleged	substantial	procedural	defects	with	his	prior	habeas	
review.45	 The	 petitioner,	 Al-Bihani,	 claimed	 that	 the	 district	 court’s	
habeas	procedure	was	impermissible	because	(1)	it	adopted	a	prepon-
derance	of	the	evidence	standard;	(2)	it	shifted	the	burden	to	Al-Bihani	
to	disprove	the	lawfulness	of	his	detention;	(3)	it	did	not	hold	a	separate	
evidentiary	hearing;	(4)	it	admitted	hearsay	evidence;	(5)	it	presumed	
the	government’s	evidence	to	be	true;	(6)	it	required	Al-Bihani	to	prove	
why	his	discovery	request	would	not	unduly	burden	the	government;	
and	(7)	it	denied	all	of	his	discovery	requests	but	one.46
39.	 Id.
40.	 Id. at	2262.
41.	 Id. at	2261-62.
42.	 Al-Bihani	v.	Obama,	590	F.3d	866	(D.C.	Cir.	2010).
43.	 Al	Maqaleh	v.	Gates,	605	F.3d	84	(D.C.	Cir.	2010).
44.	 The	Al-Bihani	opinion,	written	by	Judge	Brown,	was	joined	by	Judges	Williams	and	Kavanaugh.	
Al-Bihani,	590	F.3d	866.	The	Al Maqaleh	opinion,	written	by	Chief	Judge	Sentelle,	was	joined	by	
Judges	Tatel	and	Edwards.	Al Maqaleh,	605	F.3d	84.	
45.	 See	Al-Bihani,	590	F.3d	at	869–70.
46.	 Id. at	875–76.
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The	 D.C.	 Circuit,	 acknowledging	 the	 truthfulness	 of	 Al-Bihani’s	
claims,	cursorily	cast	aside	his	arguments:	“Al-Bihani[]	.	.	.	clearly	dem-
onstrates	error,	but	that	error	is	his	own.”47	Al-Bihani’s	error,	the	court	
explained,	was	assuming	that	criminal	habeas	precedent	was	applica-
ble	to	detainee	habeas	cases.	“Habeas	review	for	Guantánamo	detainees	
need	not	match	the	procedures	developed	by	Congress	and	the	courts	
specifically	for	habeas	challenges	to	criminal	convictions.”48	Instead,	the	
court	continued,	Boumediene	“invited	‘innovation’	of	habeas	procedures	
by	lower	courts,	[and]	grant[ed]	leeway	for	‘certain	accommodations	to	
be	made	 to	 reduce	 the	burden	habeas	corpus	proceedings	will	place	
on	the	military.’”49	The	court	thus	held	that	the	long	history	of	robust	
protections	in	the	criminal	habeas	sphere	was	wholly	inapplicable	to	
Guantánamo	detainees.	Instead,	the	panel	was	free	to	“develop	vari-
ous	procedures	applicable	to	various	circumstances	of	detention.”50	In	
the	“circumstance”	of	detainee	detention,	detainees	may	rely	only	on	a	
nascent,	post-9/11	“branch”	of	habeas	procedures	that	protect	military	
concerns	more	than	individual	rights.51	After	setting	up	this	toothless	
habeas	standard	of	review,	the	court	excused	each	of	the	government’s	
procedural	 missteps	 as	 “harmless	 error”	 not	 amounting	 to	 constitu-
tionally	impermissible	behavior,52	a	decision	the	court	acknowledged	
resulted	from	the	war’s	corrosive	effect.53
After	 Al-Bihani	 announced	 a	 restrictive	 view	 of	 the	 procedural	
protections	afforded	if	habeas	is	available,	the	issue	of	when habeas	is	
available	was	ripe	for	review.	In	Al Maqaleh,	the	D.C.	Circuit	was	pre-
sented	with	three	petitioners,	citizens	of	Yemen	and	Tunisia,	captured	
in	Pakistan	and	Thailand	and	later	transported	to	the	Bagram	deten-
tion	facility	in	Afghanistan.54	The	D.C.	Circuit	unanimously	agreed	that	
the	Suspension	Clause’s	protections	did	not	extend	to	these	petition-
ers.55	The	government	again	argued	for	a	strict	reading	of	Eisentrager	
and	 Boumediene,	 insisting	 that	 habeas	 corpus	 rights	 should	 extend	
only	to	regions	that	“may	be	considered	effectively	part	of	the	United	
States.”56	Although	the	court	explicitly	rejected	such	a	categorical	rule,57	
47.	 Id. at	876.
48.	 Al-Bihani,	590	F.3d	at	876.
49.	 Id. (quoting	Boumediene	v.	Bush,	128	S.	Ct.	2229,	2276	(2008)).
50.	 Id.
51.	 Id. at	877.
52.	 Id. at	881	(“Even	assuming	error,	the	errors	were	harmless”).
53.	 Id. at	882	(Brown,	J.,	concurring)	(“War	is	a	challenge	to	law,	and	the	law	must	adjust.	It	must	
recognize	that	the	old	wineskins	of	international	law,	domestic	criminal	procedures,	or	other	prior	
frameworks	are	ill-suited	to	the	bitter	wine	of	this	new	warfare.	We	can	no	longer	afford	diffi-
dence.	This	war	has	placed	us	not	just	at,	but	already	past	the	leading	edge	of	a	new	and	fright-
ening	paradigm,	one	 that	demands	new	rules	be	written.	Falling	back	on	 the	comfort	of	prior	
practices	supplies	only	illusory	comfort.”).
54.	 See Al	Maqaleh	v.	Gates,	605	F.3d	84,	87	(D.C.	Cir.	2010).
55.	 Id. at	99.
56.	 Id. at	94.	
57.	 See id.
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its	 application	 of	 Boumediene’s	 three-factor	 test	 makes	 uncertain	 pre-
cisely	 where	 else	 beyond	 Guantánamo	 the	 Suspension	 Clause	 could	
possibly	extend.
In	 its	 analysis	 of	 Boumediene’s	 first	 factor,	 which	 concerns	 the	
petitioners’	citizenship,	 their	status,	and	the	adequacy	of	 the	process	
leading	 to	 that	 determination,	 the	 court	 noted	 that	 the	 Al Maqaleh	
petitioners’	 citizenship	 and	 status	 “differ[ed]	 in	 no	 material	 respect	
from	 the	petitioners	at	Guantánamo	who	prevailed	 in	Boumediene.”58	
Moreover,	 because	 the	 Al Maqaleh	 petitioners’	 status	 determination	
process	“afforded	even	less	protection	to	the	rights	of	detainees”59	than	
did	the	process	at	issue	in	Boumediene,	the	court	found	that	the	first	fac-
tor	“even	more	strongly	favors	petitioners	here.”60
The	D.C.	Circuit	found	the	second	factor	—	the	nature	of	the	sites	
where	apprehension	and	detention	took	place	—	to	weigh	“heavily	in	
favor	of	 the	United	States.”61	First,	 the	 court	quietly	 sidestepped	 the	
all-important	fact	that	none	of	the	petitioners	before	it	were	captured	
in	or	were	citizens	of	Afghanistan	by	analogizing	simply	that,	“[l]ike	
all	petitioners	in	both	Eisentrager	and	Boumediene,	the	petitioners	here	
were	apprehended	abroad.”62	Second,	the	court	held	that	the	Bagram	
facility	is	of	an	entirely	different	nature	than	Guantánamo	Bay.	Despite	
both	 Bagram	 and	 Guantánamo	 Bay	 being	 subject	 to	 U.S.	 leaseholds,	
the	court	claimed	that	the	“surrounding	circumstances”	at	Bagram	are	
“hardly	 the	 same.”63	The	 court	distinguished	 the	 two	sites	using	 the	
novel	factors	of	the	government’s	intent	for	permanency	and	the	formal	
hostility	of	the	“host”	nation:	“The	United	States	manifested	its	intent	
to	remain	in	de facto control	over	Guantánamo	Bay	by	having	occupied	
the	 base	 for	 “over	a	 century	 .	 .	 .	 in	 the	 face	of	 a	hostile	government	
maintaining	de jure sovereignty	over	the	property.”64	In	contrast,	and	in	
spite	of	America’s	indefinite	leasehold	over	Bagram,	the	court	posited	
that	“there	is	no	indication	of	any	intent	to	occupy	the	base	with	perma-
nence,	nor is there hostility	on	the	part	of	the	‘host’	country.”65	Therefore,	
the	court	concluded,	any	argument	 that	 the	government	exercises	de 
facto	control	over	Bagram	is	simply	not	“realistic.”66
58.	 Id. at	96.
59.	 Id.
60.	 Al	Maqaleh	v.	Gates,	605	F.3d	84,	96	(D.C.	Cir.	2010)	(internal	citations	omitted).	
61.	 Id. 
62.	 Id.
63.	 Id. at	97.
64.	 Id.
65.	 Id. (emphasis	added).
66.	 Al	Maqaleh	v.	Gates,	605	F.3d	84,	97	(D.C.	Cir.	2010).	Future	Bagram	litigants	are	even	less	likely	
to	overcome	this	standard	in	light	of	reports	that	the	Obama	Administration	is	planning	to	turn	
over	control	over	the	Bagram	facility	to	the	Afghan	government.	See Julian	E.	Barnes,	U.S. Aims to 
Share Afghan Prison,	L.A. Times,	Jun.	9,	2010,	at	A1.	The	United	States,	however,	would	“carve	out	
a	section	of	the	prisons	for	non-Afghan	detainees	who	would	remain	under	U.S.	custody.”Id.
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In	its	treatment	of	the	third	factor,	the	court	found	Afghanistan’s	sta-
tus	as	an	active	war	zone	to	pose	“overwhelming”	“practical	obstacles”	
to	granting	habeas	review,	despite	having	just	found	the	lack	of	Afghan	
“hostility”	dispositive	in	its	factor-two	analysis.67	Unlike	the	prison	at	
Guantánamo	Bay,	the	court	argued,	the	Bagram	facilities	are	“exposed	
to	the	vagaries	of	war,”68	a	situation	that	precludes	habeas	review.	The	
court	 rested	 this	 conclusion	 on	 dicta	 from	 Eisentrager69	 that	 wartime	
trials	“hamper	the	war	effort”	because	they	result	in	the	“effective	fet-
tering	of	a	field	commander	.	.	.	[by]	allow[ing]	the	very	enemies	he	is	
ordered	to	reduce	to	submission	to	call	him	to	account	in	his	own	civil	
courts	and	divert	his	efforts	and	attention	from	the	military	offensive	
abroad	to	the	legal	defensive	at	home.”70
Finally,	the	court	dismissed	the	petitioners’	argument	that	this	hold-
ing	will	allow	the	United	States	to	“cho[o]se	the	place	of	detention	and	
.	.	.	evade	judicial	review	of	Executive	detention	decisions	by	transfer-
ring	detainees	into	active	conflict	zones,	thereby	granting	the	Executive	
the	power	to	switch	the	Constitution	on	or	off	at	will.”71	While	claiming	
not	to	“ignore”	this	argument,	the	court	stated	that	such	a	worry	has	
no	application	to	factors	two	or	three	and	thus	would	not	change	the	
outcome	of	the	case.72	The	court,	although	noting	that	“such	manipula-
tion	by	the	Executive	might	constitute	an	additional	factor”	to	be	con-
sidered,	nonetheless	concluded	that	no	manipulation	was	at	play	in	the	
instant	case.73
The	 D.C.	 Circuit’s	 holding	 in	 Al Maqaleh	 all	 but	 emasculates	
Boumediene.	Under	the	court’s	factor-two	analysis,	the	inverse	relation-
ship	between	the	“host”	and	“guest”	governments	serves	as	a	proxy	
for	intent.	The	more	“hostile”	the	host	government,	the	more	likely	it	
is	that	a	leaseholder	truly	intends	to	remain;	and,	as	a	result,	the	more	
likely	it	 is	that	the	lessee	exercises	de facto sovereignty	over	the	land.	
But	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 formal	 “peace”	 or	 “hostility”	 between	 two	
nations,	the	court	turns	the	unobjectionable	logic	of	this	argument	on	
its	head.	To	declare	that	the	otherwise-pacific	base	at	Guantánamo	per-
sists	 in	 the	face	of	“hostility,”	as	opposed	to	the	tranquility	 in	which	
67.	 Id.	 (analogizing	the	security	conditions	at	Bagram	to	 those	at	 issue	 in	Eisentrager,	where	 the	
court	found	that	security	threats	remained	high	even	after	the	formal	cessation	of	hostilities).
68.	 Id.	(distinguishing	Boumediene	in	that	no	such	exposure	was	apparent	at	Guantánamo).
69.	 See	Johnson	v.	Eisentrager,	339	U.S.	763,	776	(1950)	(“The	ancient	rule	against	suits	by	resident	
alien	enemies	has	survived	only	so	far	as	necessary	to	prevent	use	of	the	courts	to	accomplish	
a	 purpose	 which	 might	 hamper	 our	 war	 efforts	 or	 give	 aid	 to	 the	 enemy.”)	 (quoting	 Ex parte	
Kawato,	317	U.S.	69,	75	(1942)).
70.	 Al Maqaleh,	605	F.3d	at	98	(quoting	Eisentrager,	339	U.S.	at	779).
71.	 Id.	(internal	quotation	marks	omitted)	(citing	brief	for	appellees).
72.	 Id.	(finding	such	deliberate	transportation	of	detainees	into	Bagram	absent	in	this	case	without	
further	 comment	 on	 the	 evidence,	 while	 reserving	 judgment	 on	 the	 weight	 such	 a	 fact	 would	
carry	if	present).	
73.	 Id. at	99	(reaching	its	determination	in	part	by	reasoning	that	officials	could	not	have	antici-
pated	Boumediene	when	selecting	Bagram	over	a	location	outside	the	theater	of	war).
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the	Bagram	 facility	 sits,	belies	 the	actual	nature	of	 the	 two	sites	and	
stretches	the	definition	of	“hostility”	far	beyond	its	natural	meaning.	
This	definition	of	hostility	is	still	more	implausible	when	coupled	with	
the	court’s	 third-factor	analysis.	Although	Afghanistan’s	status	as	an	
active	warzone	has	no	bearing	on	whether	the	site	is	“hostile,”	it	holds	
dispositive	weight	for	factor	three.	The	court’s	second-	and	third-factor	
analyses	 together	 pack	 a	 powerful	 one-two	 punch:	 habeas	 review	 is	
unavailable	in	nations	(a)	with	which	the	United	States	is	formally	at	
peace	 and	 (b)	 in	 which	 the	 United	 States	 has	 military	 forces	 subject	
to	the	“vagaries”	of	war.	Ironically,	this	logic	applies	neatly	to	Cuba’s	
nearest	neighbor,	Haiti.	Despite	being	at	peace	with	Haiti,	America	has	
maintained	a	military	presence	 there	 since	2004,	 and	 its	 troops	 have	
been	subject	to	occasional	violent	attacks.74	After	Al Maqaleh,	a	prisoner	
detained	at	a	hypothetical	American	facility	in	Haiti	arguably	would	
have	less	right	to	habeas	protections	than	his	counterparts	incarcerated	
at	Guantánamo,	mere	miles	away	across	a	Caribbean	channel.
Such	distinctions	based	on	formal	“hostility”	underscore	how	much	
the	war	on	terror	has	eroded	federal	court	habeas	jurisprudence	since	
9/11.	Since	the	Guantánamo	inmate	population	is	expected	to	dwindle,75	
the	import	of	a	decision	limiting	extraterritorial	habeas	review	to	just	
Guantánamo	Bay	cannot	be	overstated.	For	example,	the	D.C.	Circuit	
relies	heavily	upon	the	Eisentrager	Court’s	fear	that	“calling	command-
ers	to	account”	for	habeas	review	would	disturb	the	war	effort.76	Yet,	
the	majority	opinion	never	explains	how	granting	habeas	 review	for	
prisoners	in	Afghanistan	differs	in	any	meaningful	way	from	doing	so	
for	prisoners	at	Guantánamo	Bay:	in	both	circumstances,	the	same	offi-
cer	would	need	to	appear	at	the	same	type	of	proceeding	in	the	same	
venue,	 with	 the	 only	 difference	 being	 the	 location	 of	 the	 prisoner	 at	
issue.	Finally,	 the	petitioners’	 argument	 that	 the	Executive	may	now	
capture	prisoners	anywhere	and	then	detain	them	beyond	reach	of	the	
Constitution	is	highly	salient.77	However,	the	court	gives	it	superficial	
74.	 See United Nations, UN Mission’s Contributions by Country 7 (Feb.	 28,	 2009),	 http://
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2009/	 feb09_5.pdf	 (identifying	 the	 number	 of	
United	States	 troops	and	police	active	 in	 the	 international	mission	 in	Haiti). See also U.N.	S.C.	
Rep.	of	the	Security	Council,	Apr.	13–16,	2005,	¶17,	U.N.	Doc.	S/2005/302	(May	6,	2005)	(detailing	
the	combat	deaths	of	several	members	of	the	United	Nations	mission	in	Haiti).	See generally U.N. 
Dep’t of Pub. Info., Stabilization Mission in Haiti: Facts and Figures,	http://www.un.org/
en/	 peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml	 (2010)	 (providing	 references	 to	 Security	
Council	resolutions	authorizing	the	mission	in	Haiti	since	2004,	along	with	lists	of	contributing	
countries,	total	deployment	strength,	and	mission	fatalities).
75.	 See Cloud	&	Barnes,	supra note	13	(reporting	that	no	prisoners	have	been	sent	to	Guantánamo	
under	the	Obama	administration).
76.	 Al Maqaleh,	605	F.3d	at	98	(finding	the	arguments	against	allowing	the	Eisentrager prisoners	ac-
cess	to	civil	courts	even	more	persuasive	when	applied	to	Bagram)	(citing	Johnson	v.	Eisentrager,	
339	U.S.	776,	779	(1950)).
77.	 See id. (“[W]ithout	dismissing	the	legitimacy	or	sincerity	of	appellees’	concerns	[regarding	the	
government’s	possible	ability	to	transfer	detainees	to	avoid	constitutional	protections],	we	doubt	
that	this	fact	goes	to	either	the	second	or	third	of	the	Supreme	Court’s	enumerated	factors.”).
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treatment,	noting	only	that	a	showing	in	some	future	case	of	govern-
mental	intent	to	circumvent	habeas	review	might	change	its	analysis.	It	
is	far	from	certain,	however,	what	showing	would	be	needed	to	trigger	
this	exception.	For	neither	Congress’s	attempts	to	strip	federal	habeas	
jurisdiction	nor	a	White	House	official’s	admission	that	the	prison	at	
Bagram	is	being	expanded,	in	part,	because	the	United	States	“has	few	
other	places	to	hold	and	interrogate	foreign	prisoners	without	giving	
them	access	to	the	U.S.	court	system,”78	demonstrate	the	requisite	gov-
ernmental	intent	to	circumvent	the	judiciary.
Al Maqaleh’s	reasoning	is	expansive	enough	to	preclude	from	habeas	
protections	all	 future	detainees	except	for	those	at	Guantánamo,	and	
Al-Bihani	ensures	that	even	those	who	get	habeas	review	will	find	the	
Great	Writ	to	offer	less-than-great	protection.	Together,	these	two	“war-
time”	decisions	distort	habeas	 into	 something	much	weaker	 than	 its	
pre-9/11,	or	even	pre-Boumediene,	analogue.	Indeed,	in	Boumediene,	the	
Supreme	Court	declared	“[t]he	laws	and	Constitution	are	designed	to	
survive,	and	remain	in	force,	in	extraordinary	times.	Liberty	and	secu-
rity	can	be	reconciled,	and	in	our	system	they	are	reconciled	within	the	
framework	of	the	law.”79	Yet	less	than	two	years	after	that	statement,	
Al-Bihani’s	bold	pronouncement	that	“[w]ar	is	a	challenge	to	law,	and	
the	law	must	adjust,”80	indicates	a	frightening	new	chapter	in	wartime	
habeas	jurisprudence.
III. MIlItary DetentIon anD CrIMInal InCarCeratIon
Detention	has	long	been	one	of	the	most	contentious	issues	in	the	
war	on	terror.81	The	Executive’s	claimed	ability	to	detain	suspected	ter-
rorists	indefinitely	has	been	controversial,	but	is	technically	permitted	
under	a	Congressional	mandate	granting	 the	President	broad	deten-
tion	power.82	Many	detainees	have	languished	for	over	eight	years	in	
facilities	at	Guantánamo	Bay	and	elsewhere,	often	without	charges	or	
a	chance	to	contest	the	facts	leading	to	their	detention.83	Despite	initial	
78.	 Cloud	&	Barnes,	supra note	13.
79.	 Boumediene	v.	Bush,	128	S.	Ct.	2229,	2277	(2008).
80.	 Al-Bihani	v.	Obama,	509	F.3d	866,	886	(D.C.	Cir.	2010)	(Brown,	J.,	concurring).
81.	 See, e.g.,	Allison	M.	Danner,	Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story,	43	Tex. 
Int’l L.J. 1 (2007); Glazier,	supra note	10.
82.	 See Harold	 Koh,	 Legal	Advisor,	 U.S.	 Dep’t	 of	 State,	 Remarks	 at	 the	Annual	 Meeting	 of	 the	
American	Society	of	International	Law	(Mar.	25,	2010)	(“The	federal	courts	have	confirmed	our	le-
gal	authority	to	detain	in	the	Guantanamo	habeas	cases,	but	the	Administration	is	not	asserting	an	
unlimited	detention	authority.	For	example,	with	regard	to	individuals	detained	at	Guantánamo	
.	 .	 .	we	are	resting	our	detention	authority	on	a	domestic	statute	—	the	2001	Authorization	for	
Use	of	Military	Force	(AUMF)	—	as	informed	by	the	principles	of	the	laws	of	war.	Our	detention	
authority	in	Afghanistan	comes	from	the	same	source.”);	see also Authorization	for	Use	of	Military	
Force,	S.	J.	Res.	23,	107th	Cong.,	115	Stat.	224	(2001).
83.	 See Marc	Ambinder,	Inside the Secret Interrogation Facility at Bagram, Atlantic	(May	14,	2010),	
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/	10/05/inside-the-secret-interrogation-facility-at-
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cues	to	the	contrary,84	the	Obama	Administration	is	weighing	a	major	
expansion	of	its	military	detention	program	that	would	involve	a	per-
manent	prison	facility	at	the	United	States	Air	Force	Base	in	Bagram,	
Afghanistan,	where	about	800	terror	suspects	currently	await	charges.85
Detainees	 appear	 to	 have	 lost	 in	 their	 struggle	 to	 apply	 interna-
tional	 legal	 norms	 —	 which	 would	 otherwise	 mandate	 their	 release	
at	a	conflict’s	conclusion86	—	to	 the	United	States’	military	detention	
bagram/56678	(“The	Defense	Intelligence	Agency	(DIA)	runs	a	classified	interrogation	facility	for	
high-value	detainees	inside	Bagram	Air	Field	in	Afghanistan,	defense	and	administration	officials	
said,	and	prisoners	there	are	sometimes	subject	to	tougher	interrogation	methods	than	those	used	
elsewhere.”);	Hilary	Andersson,	Red Cross Confirms ‘Second Jail’ at Bagram, Afghanistan,	BBC News	
(May	 11,	 2010),	 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8674179.stm	 (noting	 the	 existence	 of	
separate,	distinct,	and	until	recently,	secret	holding	facility	at	the	Bagram	Air	Force	Base).	
84.	 See Exec.	 Order	 No.	 13,492,	 74	 Fed.	 Reg.	 4,897	 (Jan.	 22,	 2009)	 (ordering	 the	 closure	 of	 the	
Guantánamo	 Bay	 Detention	 Center	 by	 Jan.	 22,	 2010).	 Nevertheless,	 The	 White	 House	 law-
yer	 who	 originally	 led	 the	 efforts	 to	 end	 Guantánamo’s	 role	 as	 a	 detention	 and	 tribunal	 cen-
ter,	 Daniel	 J.	 Meltzer,	 resigned	 in	 early	 May.	 See also Charlie	 Savage,	 White House Deputy 
Counsel Resigns,	 Caucus	 (May	 7,	 2010),	 http://thecaucus.blogs.	 nytimes.com/	 2010/05/07/
white-house-deputy-counsel-resigns.
85.	 See	Cloud	&	Barnes,	supra,	note	13.	See	also Ambinder,	supra	note	83;	Andersson,	supra	note	
83.	This	 expansion	 is	 especially	worrisome	given	 recent	allegations	 from	Bush	Administration	
defense	officials	that	many	Guantánamo	Bay	and	Abu	Ghraib	inmates	were	wrongfully	detained	
and	are,	in	fact,	innocent.	See Sworn	Declaration	of	Col.	Lawrence	B.	Wilkerson	at	5,	Hamad	v.	
Bush,	CV	05-1009	JDB	(D.D.C.	Mar.	24,	2010)	(“It	was	.	.	.	clear	that	many	of	the	men	were	innocent,	
or	at	a	minimum	their	guilt	was	impossible	to	determine	let	alone	prove	in	any	court	of	law,	civil-
ian	or	military.”);	Id. at	8	(“[M]y	investigation	into	the	Abu	Ghraib	detentions	revealed	that	some	
50–60%	of	those	imprisoned	in	Abu	Ghraib	were	probably	innocent.”).	Wilkerson’s	declaration	in	
support	of	Adel	Hassan	Hamad’s	civil	suit	marks	the	first	time	a	Bush	Administration	official	has,	
under	oath,	proclaimed	the	innocence	and	wrongful	detention	of	a	Guantánamo	detainee.	In	his	
declaration,	Wilkerson	makes	a	range	of	allegations	regarding	Hamad’s	innocence	in	particular	
as	well	as	the	failures	of	the	military	detention	system	in	general:	“With	respect	to	the	assertions	
by	Mr.	Hamad	that	he	was	wrongfully	seized	and	detained,	it	became	apparent	to	me	as	early	
as	August	2002,	and	probably	earlier	to	other	State	Department	personnel	who	were	focused	on	
these	 issues,	 that	many	of	 the	prisoners	detained	at	Guantánamo	had	been	taken	into	custody	
without	regard	to	whether	they	were	truly	enemy	combatants,	or	in	fact	whether	many	of	them	
were	enemies	at	all.	 I	soon	realized	from	my	conversations	with	military	colleagues	as	well	as	
foreign	service	officers	in	the	field	that	many	of	the	detainees	were,	in	fact,	victims	of	incompetent	
battlefield	vetting.” Id. at	4.
86.	 See, e.g.,	 Al-Bihani	 v.	 Obama,	 590	 F.3d	 866,	 871	 (D.C.	 Cir.	 2010)	 (citing	 Geneva	 Convention	
Relative	to	the	Treatment	of	Prisoners	of	War	(Third	Geneva	Convention)	art.	118,	Aug.	12,	1949,	6	
U.S.T.	3316,	75	U.N.T.S.	135).	See also	Geneva	Convention	Relative	to	the	Treatment	of	Prisoners	of	
War	art.	118,	Aug.	12,	1949,	6	U.S.T.	3316,	75	U.N.T.S.	135)	(“Prisoners	of	war	shall	be	released	and	
repatriated	without	delay	after	the	cessation	of	active	hostilities.”);	see also	Hague	Convention	on	
Laws	and	Customs	of	War	on	Land	art.	20,	July	29,	1899,	32	Stat.	1817	(requiring	repatriation	after	
“conclusion	of	peace”);	Hague	Convention	Respecting	the	Laws	and	Customs	of	War	on	Land,	
art.	20,	Oct.	18,	1907,	36	Stat.	2301	(also	requiring	repatriation	“[a]fter	the	conclusion	of	peace”);	
Geneva	Convention	Relative	to	the	Treatment	of	Prisoners	of	War	art.	75,	July	27,	1929,	47	Stat.	
2055	(noting	that	repatriation	should	be	accomplished	“with	the	least	possible	delay	after	conclu-
sion	of	peace”);	Jordan	J.	Paust,	Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained 
without Trial,	44	Harv. Int’l L.J. 503,	510-511	(2003)	(noting	that	prisoners	of	war	“can	be	detained	
during	an	armed	conflict,	but	the	detaining	country	must	release	and	repatriate	them	‘without	de-
lay	after	the	cessation	of	active	hostilities,’	unless	they	are	being	lawfully	prosecuted	or	have	been	
lawfully	convicted	of	crimes	and	are	serving	sentences.”)	(citing	Geneva	Convention	Relative	to	
the	Treatment	of	Prisoners	of	War	arts.	85,	99,	118,	119,	129,	Aug.	12,	1949,	6	U.S.T.	3316,	75	U.N.T.S.	
135.).
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scheme.	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld	made	clear	that	America’s	military	engage-
ment	justifying	detention	could	last	indefinitely87	and,	even	if	the	war	
ended,	Al-Bihani v. Obama introduced	the	principle	that	detention	may	
outlast	the	end	of	an	engagement.88
Article	 III	 trials,	 therefore,	 seem	 to	 offer	 the	 greatest	 protection	
against	arbitrary	and	indefinite	detention.	Regardless	what	process	the	
courts	followed,	alleged	terrorists	would	still	receive	a	sentence	match-
ing	 the	 crime	 for	 which	 they	 were	 convicted.	 But	 a	 recent	 Supreme	
Court	 decision	 and	 a	 proposed	 rule	 from	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Prisons	 cast	
doubt	on	whether	Article	III	trials	—	and,	more	importantly,	Article	III	
sentences	—	will	continue	to	protect	against	indefinite	detention.
The	Supreme	Court’s	ruling	in	United States v. Comstock	sets	a	dis-
turbing	precedent	for	terrorist-detainees.89	Comstock	involved	sentenc-
ing	issues	for	sex	offenders,	a	topic	seemingly	unrelated	to	terrorism.	
Yet	 the	 Court	 held	 that	 Congress	 may	 use	 its	 Necessary	 and	 Proper	
Clause	powers	to	permanently	detain	dangerous	sex	offenders	if	they	
appear	to	pose	a	threat	to	the	surrounding	community	upon	release.90	
That	Congress	may	order	the	civil	commitment	of	dangerous	prison-
ers	after	completing	their	sentences	sets	the	stage	for	transplanting	an	
indefinite	 detention	 regime	 into	 the	 criminal	 sphere.	 The	 possibility	
that	this	reasoning	would	or	could	be	extended	to	cover	terrorists	sub-
ject	to	Article	III	criminal	sentencing	is	far	from	remote.	Indeed,	many	
commentators	noticed	instantly	Comstock’s	potential	impact	on	terror-
connected	inmates.91
87.	 Hamdi	v.	Rumsfeld,	542	U.S.	507,	520	(2004)	(“If	the	Government	does	not	consider	this	un-
conventional	war	won	for	two	generations,	and	if	it	maintains	during	that	time	that	[a	detainee]	
might,	if	released,	rejoin	forces	fighting	against	the	United	States,	then	the	position	it	has	taken	
throughout	 the	 litigation	of	 this	case	suggests	 that	 [his]	detention	could	 last	 for	 the	rest	of	his	
life.”).	The	“end	of	an	engagement”	is	dependent	on	a	political	determination	that	could	come	
long	after	the	actual	violence	in	which	the	combatant	was	involved	ends.
88.	 	Indeed,	in	Al-Bihani,	the	court	relied	on	the	petitioner’s	avowed	quasi-military	service	as	a	jus-
tification	for	his	detention	but	paradoxically	disregarded	such	status	with	respect	to	Al-Bihani’s	
request	 for	 release.	 See Al-Bihani,	 590	 F.3d	 at	 872-74.	 The	 court	 notes	 that	 there	 are	 currently	
enough	U.S.	troops	in	Afghanistan	to	consider	it	an	ongoing	conflict	that	justifies	continued	deten-
tion,	which	implies	that	the	eventual	U.S.	exit	from	Afghanistan	would	trigger	the	release	of	those	
held	in	military	detention	according	to	international	norms.	Id. at	874.	But	the	court	confronts	the	
specter	of	a	future	release	directly	—	and	depressingly.	According	to	the	court,	releasing	Al-Bihani	
at	the	end	of	hostilities	“would	make	each	successful	campaign	of	a	long	war	but	a	Pyrrhic	pre-
lude	to	defeat.	The	initial	success	of	the	United	States	.	.	.	in	ousting	the	Taliban	from	the	seat	of	
government	and	establishing	a	young	democracy	would	trigger	an	obligation	to	release	Taliban	
fighters	captured	in	earlier	clashes.	Thus,	the	victors	would	be	commanded	to	constantly	refresh	
the	ranks	of	the	fledgling	democracy’s	most	likely	saboteurs.”	Id.	
89.	 See United	States	v.	Comstock,	130	S.	Ct.	1949	(2010).	
90.	 See id.	at	1965	(holding	that	the	statute	in	question	“is	a	‘necessary	and	proper’	means	of	exer-
cising	the	federal	authority	that	permits	Congress	to	create	federal	criminal	laws,	to	punish	their	
violation,	to	imprison	violators,	to	provide	appropriately	for	those	imprisoned,	and	to	maintain	
the	security	of	those	who	are	not	imprisoned	but	who	may	be	affected	by	the	federal	imprison-
ment	of	others.”).	
91.	 See, e.g.,	Lauren	M.	Kulpa,	Comment,	U.S.	v.	Comstock,	43	Loy. L.A. L. Rev. (forthcoming	2011)	
(noting	 prominent	 criticisms	 regarding	 Comstock’s	 potential	 impact	 in	 terror-related	 incarcera-
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The	statute	at	issue	in	Comstock authorizes	a	court	to	civilly	com-
mit	 a	 soon-to-be-released	 prisoner	 if	 he	 (1)	 previously	 “engaged	 or	
attempted	to	engage	in	sexually	violent	conduct	or	child	molestation,”	
(2)	“suffers	from	a	serious	mental	illness,	abnormality,	or	disorder,”	and	
(3)	as	a	result	of	the	disorder,	remains	“sexually	dangerous	to	others”	
such	that	“he	would	have	serious	difficulty	in	refraining	from	sexually	
violent	conduct	or	child	molestation	if	released.”92	If	a	court	finds	all	
of	these	factors,	it	may	commit	the	prisoner	to	the	Attorney	General’s	
custody,	who	must	make	“all	reasonable	efforts”	to	return	the	prisoner	
to	the	state	in	which	he	was	tried	or	in	which	he	is	domiciled.93	If	the	
Attorney	General	is	unsuccessful	in	this	endeavor,	the	prisoner	is	sent	
to	a	federal	treatment	facility	and	remains	there	until	he	is	no	longer	
dangerous.94
By	 its	 terms,	 this	 statute	 applies	 to	 sex	 criminals,	 not	 terrorists.	
Nevertheless,	 this	opinion,	which	garnered	the	support	of	seven	 jus-
tices,	clears	away	any	foreseeable	barriers	to	Congress	issuing	a	simi-
lar	statute	aimed	at	terrorists.	After	Comstock,	Congress	may	authorize	
the	 Attorney	 General	 to	 detain	 “dangerous”	 criminals	 in	 perpetuity	
after	the	termination	of	their	sentences	under	its	Necessary	and	Proper	
Clause	powers.	A	statute	codifying	that	notion	would	alter	terrorism	
prosecutions	radically.
Of	 all	 terrorism-related	 indictments	 between	 2001	 and	 2009,	 478	
have	resulted	in	criminal	sentences.95	Of	those,	a	plurality	of	220	led	to	
a	sentence	of	less	than	one	year,	and	an	additional	134	led	to	a	sentence	
of	between	one	and	five	years.96	A	mere	 twenty-six	convictions	have	
led	to	a	sentence	of	thirty	or	more	years.97	Thus,	74%	of	terror	prosecu-
tions	result	in	the	defendant	serving	less	than	five	years	in	prison.	This	
relatively	 light	sentencing	 is	a	byproduct	of	 the	difficulty	of	proving	
in	court	some	of	the	government’s	more	serious	allegations,	like	those	
falling	under	 the	“Terrorism”	chapter	of	 the	U.S.	Code.98	As	a	result,	
only	29.5%	of	suspected	terrorists’	indictments	even	included	a	charge	
under	a	“terrorism”	statute.99	Many	suspected	terrorists	instead	have	
tion);	Dahlia	Lithwick,	Detention Slip,	Slate	(May	18,	2010),	http://www.slate.com/id/2254223	
(“[T]he	more	worrisome	question	is	whether	this	very	expansive	view	of	federal	crime-fighting	
authority	would	carry	over	to	terrorism	suspects	whom	the	government	may	want	to	detain	with-
out	trial.”).
92.	 18	U.S.C.	§	4247(a)(5)-(6)	(2006).	See also	18	U.S.C.	§	4248(d)	(2006)	(authorizing	civil	commit-
ment	of	sexually	dangerous	persons	according	to	the	definitions	set	forth	in	§	4247).	
93.	 See	Comstock,	130	S.	Ct.	at	1954	(citing	18	U.S.C.	§	4248(d)).
94.	 18	U.S.C.	§	4248(d).
95.	 Center on Law & Sec., New York Univ. Sch. of Law, Highlights from the Terrorist Trial 
Report Card 2001–2009: Lessons Learned	11	(2009).
96.	 Id.
97.	 Id.
98.	 18	U.S.C.	§	2331	(2006).	
99.	 Highlights from the Terrorist Trial Report Card,	supra note	95.
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been	charged	with	 immigration	and	weapons	violations,	resulting	in	
significantly	lesser	penalties.100
The	obvious	and	ominous	portent	of	the	Comstock	decision	is	that	
the	government	may	obtain	a	conviction	for	a	suspected	terrorist	on	a	
relatively	minor	charge	carrying	a	light	sentence	and	then,	after	the	con-
clusion	of	the	sentence,	declare	the	prisoner	to	be	“dangerous”	and	thus	
subject	to	indefinite	detention.	Indeed,	Obama	Administration	officials	
have	admitted	that	part	of	the	government’s	unwillingness	to	release	
Guantánamo	inmates	to	criminal	authorities	is	driven	by	the	perceived	
difficulty	 the	government	will	have	 in	obtaining	an	adequately	 long	
sentence	for	“known”	terrorists	if	sufficient	evidence	is	lacking.101	If	a	
conviction	for	a	lesser	crime	could	be	obtained,	Comstock’s	logic	would	
offer	an	attractive	avenue	for	closing	Guantánamo	while	detaining	its	
former	inmates	indefinitely.
It	 is	 not	 hard	 to	 imagine	 a	 slightly	 altered	 version	 of	 the	 statute	
at	 issue	 in	Comstock	 applying	 in	a	 terrorism	context.	Congress	 could	
tweak	 the	 Comstock statute	 to	 allow	 indefinite	 detention	 based	 on	 a	
finding	that	a	prisoner	(1)	previously	“engaged	or	attempted	to	engage	
in	 [terrorism-related]	violent	 conduct,”	 (2)	 remains	 committed	 to	his	
terrorist	cause,	and	(3)	as	a	result	of	his	terrorism	connections,	remains	
“dangerous	to	others”	such	that	“he	would	have	serious	difficulty	in	
refraining	 from	[terrorist	or]	violent	conduct	 if	 released.”	 In	essence,	
Comstock permits	the	Executive	to	entertain	the	notion:	“once	a	danger	
to	children,	always	a	danger	to	children.”	This,	 in	itself,	 is	troubling.	
The	 more	 troubling	 analogue,	 though,	 is	 “once	 a	 terrorist,	 always	 a	
terrorist,”	 which	 seems	 a	 likely	 conclusion	 given	 predictions	 that	Al	
Qaeda	will	never	cease	to	exist.102	If	Al	Qaeda	or	its	analogues	are	still	
operational	 upon	 a	 prisoner’s	 scheduled	 release,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 see	
100.	Id.
101.	See generally	 Peter	 Finn,	 Panel on Guantanamo backs indefinite detention for some,	 Wash. Post,	
Jan.	 22,	 2010,	 at	 A1 (noting	 that	 detainees	 can	 challenge	 evidence	 which	 may	 compromise	
intelligence-gathering).	
102.	Present	understandings	of	Al	Qaeda	suggest	that	its	organizational	structure	makes	its	exter-
mination	an	unachievable	goal.	Indeed,	“Al	Qaeda	is	a	phenomenon	that	defies	scorecard	eval-
uations.	 .	 .	 .	 [Y]ou	 never	 know	 how	 close	 you	 are	 to	 reaching	 an	 objective.”	 Michael	 Brenner,	
Al-Qaeda On the Ropes?,	 Huffington Post	 (Apr.	 26,	 2010),	 http://www.huffingtonpost	 .com/
michael-brenner/al-qaeda-on-the-ropes_b_552324.html.	 Brenner’s	 take	 on	 Al-Qaeda	 suggests	
that	Al-Qaeda	is	more	an	idea	than	an	entity,	making	the	notion	of	defeating	it	all-but-impossible:	
“Using	a	proper	noun,	our	minds	instinctively	conjure	the	image	of	an	entity	of	well	defined	con-
tours	and	dimension	.	.	.	.	[But	the]	phenomenon	we	call	al-Qaeda	is	amorphous,	diffuse	and	in	a	
continual	state	of	flux.	This	is	especially	true	after	9/11	and	during	its	years	of	duress.	The	exact	
links	between	al-Qaeda	in	Mesopotamia	and	“headquarters”	in	AfPak	are	obscure	even	to	official	
Washington.	.	.	.	“Al-Qaeda”	is	not	the	counterpart	to	the	numerous	nationalist	movements	we	
have	known.	It	is	not	geo-politically	focused	on	a	specific	plot	of	ground;	its	aims	are	changeable	
.	.	.	.	al-Qaeda	in	AfPak,	al-Qaeda	in	Mesopotamia,	al-Qaeda	in	the	Maghreb,	al-Qaeda	in	Arabia,	
al-Qaeda	in	East	Africa	are	all	linked	in	various	ways	with	other	outfits	.	.	.	.	Hence,	each	al-Qaeda	
unit’s	capability,	tactics	and	orientation	are	partially	a	function	of	those	shifting	ties	and	the	for-
tunes	of	their	associates.	Those	associates,	in	turn,	are	even	more	diffuse	than	is	the	local	al-Qaeda	
itself.”	Id.
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how	a	 terrorist	 could	 ever	overcome	 the	Government’s	 assertions	of	
“dangerousness.”	Regardless	of	whether	this	is	a	wise	step,	it	is	a	sig-
nificant	departure	from	our	standard	approach	to	prison	sentences.
A	recent	proposed	rule	by	the	Bureau	of	Prisons,	which	will	alter	
the	criminal	detention	landscape	dramatically,	draws	Comstock’s	poten-
tial	impact	into	sharp	relief.103	In	December	2006,	the	Bureau	of	Prisons	
created	the	first	of	two	“Communication	Management	Units”	(CMU)	
in	Terra	Haute,	 Indiana.104	Another	CMU	followed	in	March	2008,	 in	
Marion,	 Illinois.105	According	 to	a	Bureau	of	Prisons	spokesperson	at	
the	time,	 the	CMUs	were	“established	to	house	 inmates	who,	due	to	
their	current	offense	of	conviction,	offense	conduct,	or	other	verified	
information,	require	increased	monitoring	of	communications	between	
the	inmate	and	persons	in	the	community	in	order	to	protect	the	safety,	
security	and	orderly	operation	of	Bureau	facilities,	and	to	protect	the	
public.”106	 Despite	 this	 innocuous	 description,	 the	 two	 CMUs	 drew	
immense	criticism.107	Dubbed	“Little	Guantánamos”	for	the	austere	con-
ditions	imposed	on	inmates,	CMUs	were	separate	areas	of	the	prison	
into	which	the	government	placed	mostly	Arab	Muslims	suspected	of	
having	terrorist	ties.108	Once	there,	the	CMU	inmates’	communications	
with	 the	 outside	 world	 was	 limited	 severely.109	 This	 allowed	 prison	
wardens	at	the	two	CMUs	to	ghettoize	suspected	terrorists	and	moni-
tor	their	restricted	communications.110
Because	of	the	significant	opposition	to	these	CMUs,	their	imple-
mentation	remained	limited	to	the	two	facilities	at	Marion	and	Terra	
Haute	 and	 it	 seemed	 that	 the	 CMU	 “experiment”	 would	 be	 phased	
out.111	Instead,	the	new	proposed	rule	codifies	the	current	CMU	scheme	
of	 segregated	 detention	 and	 permits	 federal	 prisons	 throughout	 the	
United	States	to	institute	their	own	CMUs.	Citing	the	need	to	protect	
against	 the	 danger	 of	 coded	 messages	 sent	 by	 prisoners,112	 the	 rule	
increases	the	already	draconian	limitations	on	CMU	inmates’	contact	
103.	Communication	Management	Units,	75	Fed.	Reg.	17,324,	17,327–29	(proposed	Apr.6,	2010)	(to	
be	codified	at	28	C.F.R.	pt.	540(j)).
104.	See Communication	Management	Units,	75	Fed.	Reg.	at	17,324.
105.	Id.
106.	Dean	Kuipers,	Isolation prisons under fire,	L.A. Times,	Jun.	18,	2009,	at	A11.	
107.	See, e.g.,	Dan	Eggen,	Facility Holding Terrorism Inmates Limits Communication,	Wash. Post,	Feb.	
25,	2007,	at	A7;	Daniel	McGowan,	Tales from Inside the U.S. Gitmo,	Huffington Post	(Jun.	8,	2009),	
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-mcgowan/tales-from-inside-the-us_b_212632.html.
108.	See Eggen,	supra note	107.
109.	See	McGowan,	supra	note	107	(revealing	that	CMU	inmate	communication	with	family	and	at-
torneys	outside	the	prison	was	nearly	impossible).
110.	Indeed,	the	Bureau	of	Prisons	has	stated	that	CMU	“will	not	be	limited	to	inmates	convicted	of	
terrorism-related	cases,	though	all	of	the	prisoners	fit	that	description.”	McGowan,	supra note	107.
111.	See Eggen,	supra note	107.
112.	See Communication	Management	Units,	75	Fed.	Reg.	17,324,	17,326	(proposed	Apr.	6,	2010)	(to	
be	codified	at	28	C.F.R.	pt.	540(j)).	See also Turner	v.	Safley,	482	U.S.	78,	93	(1987)	(noting	danger	
of	coded	prison	messages);	United	States	v.	Hammoud,	381	F.3d	316,	334	(4th	Cir.	2004)	(same);	
United	States	v.	Salameh,	152	F.3d	88,	108	(2d	Cir.	1998)	(same).
73749_AU_LPB.indd   26 12/20/10   8:27 AM
	 Legislation & Policy Brief	 27
with	 persons	 within	 and	 without	 the	 prison:	 communication	 would	
be	 limited	to	a	maximum	of	three	pieces	of	double-sided	paper,	sent	
and	received	once	per	week,	to	and from	a	single	recipient,113	a	limit	the	
prison	warden	may	reduce	as	he	deems	“necessary.”114
More	 troubling	 than	severity	conditions	within	a	CMU	is	 the	
ease	with	which	the	government	may	channel	 inmates	 into	one.	The	
rule	gives	expansive	discretion	to	prison	wardens	for	deciding	whom	
to	place	within	a	CMU.115	According	to	the	Bureau	of	Prisons:
Inmates	may	be	designated	to	a	CMU	if	evidence	of	the	
following	criteria	exists:
(a)	 The	 inmate’s	 current	 offense(s)	 of	 conviction,	
or offense conduct,	included	association,	communi-
cation,	or	 involvement,	related	to	international	or	
domestic	terrorism;	[or]
(b)	 The	 inmate’s	 current	 offense(s)	 of	 conviction,	
or offense conduct,	 or	 activity	 while	 incarcerated,	
indicates	 a	 propensity	 to	 encourage,	 coordinate,	
facilitate,	or	otherwise	act	in	furtherance	of,	illegal	
activity	 through	 communication	 with	 persons	 in	
the	community	.	.	.	.116
These	provisions	apply	to	any	inmate	even	tenuously	connected	to	ter-
rorism,	since	the	criteria	demand	merely	that	evidence	of	a	terrorism	
connection	 exist	 to	 justify	 CMU	 detention.117	 And,	 despite	 the	 rule’s	
stated	 purpose	 of	 preventing	 all	 forms	 of	 dangerous	 communica-
tion	from	all	groups	of	prisoners,	the	short	history	of	CMUs	thus	far	
has	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 its	 inmates	 are	Arab	 Muslims	
charged	with	or	suspected	of	having	terrorist	ties.118
113.	See Communication	Management	Units,	75	Fed.	Reg.	at	17,328.
114.	See id. 
115.	Id.	This	decision	must	be	based	on	a	review	of	the	evidence	and	a	conclusion	that	the	inmate’s	
designation	to	a	CMU	“is	necessary	to	ensure	the	safety,	security,	and	orderly	operation	of	cor-
rectional	facilities,	or	protect	the	public.”	Id.
116.	Id. The	rule	goes	on	to	include	prisoners	who,	because	of	a	demonstrated	propensity	to	com-
municate	with	either	coconspirators	or	victims	of	their	crimes,	may	also	be	placed	in	a	CMU.	Id. 
(allowing	CMU	detention	of	inmates	who	have	demonstrated	a	propensity	to	contact	the	victims	
of	the	inmate’s	current	offense	of	conviction).
117.	By	creating	a	subclass	of	prisoners	based	on	ties	to	a	charge	of	“terrorism,”	which	encompasses	
myriad	criminal	statutes,	the	Bureau	may	unwittingly	group	together	prisoners	ranging	from	Al	
Qaeda	operatives	to	disgruntled	domestic	bombmakers.	See, e.g., 18	U.S.C.	§	2332a	(2006)	(defin-
ing	“weapons	of	mass	destruction”	in	part	as	“destructive	devices”,	which	includes	any	type	of	
bomb,	grenade,	mine	or	“projectile	device”	with	a	wide	barrel.	18	U.S.C.	§	921	(2006)).	This	flex-
ible	statute	has	been	used	to	convict	terrorists	like	Zacharias	Moussaoui,	Richard	Reid,	and	Umar	
Farouk	Abdulmutallab	alongside	a	disgruntled	Arkansas	doctor	and,	 recently,	members	of	 the	
Hutaree	Milita.
118.	See	McGowan,	supra note	107.	See Communication	Management	Units,	75	Fed.	Reg.	at	17,328	
(requiring	 demonstrated	 attempt	 to	 make	 an	 impermissible	 contact	 while	 also	 allowing	 CMU	
designation	based	solely	on	conviction	offense).	
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The	combination	of	Comstock	and	the	CMU	regulations	resembles	a	
legally	sanctioned	Guantánamo-type	detention	regime	set	up	lawfully	
within	 the	 United	 States.	 Suspected	 terrorists	 can	 be	 held	 in	 highly	
monitored	and	austere	containment,	indefinitely.	This	not	only	mirrors	
the	military	tribunal	detention	system,	but	in	many	ways,	exacerbates	
its	 perceived	 infirmities.	 For,	 although	 the	 Obama	 Administration	
has	acknowledged	that	it	will	indefinitely	detain	some	terrorists	even	
after	 they	 complete	 their	 tribunal-imposed	 sentences,119	 the	 range	 of	
those	 persons	 implicated	 by	 military	 tribunals	 is	 much	 smaller	 than	
the	 reach	 of	 Comstock	 and	 the	 CMU	 regulations.120	 The	 Government	
has	 conceded	 that	 the	 Authorization	 for	 Use	 of	 Military	 Force	 per-
mits	 Executive	 detention	 only	 of	 non-citizen	 enemy	 combatants	 and	
unprivileged	belligerents.121	Thus,	 the	biggest	 single	exception	 to	 the	
Executive’s	broad	military	detention	authority	had	been	American	citi-
zens,	 precluded	 from	 military	 commission	 jurisdiction.122	 Diplomatic	
concerns	had	further	barred	full	tribunal	trials	for	British,	Australian,	
and	Canadian	citizens.123	Since	a	growing	number	of	recent	terror	sus-
pects	have	been	American	or	British,124	it	appeared	that	indefinite	and	
segregated	 Executive	 detention	 would	 have	 limited	 future	 applica-
tion.	But	neither	Comstock	nor	the	CMU	regulation	is	so	limited:	both	
would	apply	fully	to	American	and	foreign	citizens	alike.	And	because	
a	criminal’s	offense	conduct,	which	cannot	be	changed,	serves	as	the	
	underlying	justification	for	Comstock	and	CMU	detention,	both	have	
the	capacity	to	last	indefinitely.125
119.	See Charlie	Savage,	Detainees Will Still Be Held, but not Not Tried,	N.Y. Times,	Jan.	22,	2010,	at	A14	
(noting	that	fifty	detainees	are	“are	too	difficult	to	prosecute	but	too	dangerous	to	release”).
120.	Commissions’	“jurisdiction	[are]	substantially	narrower	than	our	federal	courts:	they	are	prop-
erly	used	only	in	connection	with	an	armed	conflict,	and	only	to	prosecute	offenses	against	the	
law	of	war	committed	in	the	course	of	that	conflict.”	Memorandum	from	Brad	Wiegmann	&	Mark	
Martins,	supra	note	7.	See al-Marri,	534	F.3d	at	230	(Motz,	J.	concurring)	(“Quirin, Hamdi,	and	Padilla	
all	emphasize	that	Milligan’s	teaching	—	that	our	Constitution	does	not	permit	the	Government	to	
subject	civilians	within	the	United	States	to	military	jurisdiction	—	remains	good	law.”).
121.	See Authorization	 for	 Use	 of	 Military	 Force,	S.	 J.	 Res.	 23,	 107th	 Cong.,	 115	 Stat.	 224	 (2001);	
see also al-Marri	v.	Pucciarelli,	534	F.3d	213,	237	(4th	Cir.	2008)	(Motz,	J.	concurring)	(noting	the	
Government’s	concession	of	this	point	at	oral	argument); Koh,	supra	note	82	(“[I]ndividuals	who	
are	part	of	an	organized	armed	group	like	al-Qaeda	can	be	subject	to	law	of	war	detention	for	
the	duration	of	the	current	conflict.	[This	includes]	whether	an	individual	joined	with	or	became	
part	of	al-Qaeda	or	Taliban	forces	or	associated	forces,	which	can	be	demonstrated	by	relevant	
evidence	of	formal	or	functional	membership,	which	may	include	an	oath	of	loyalty,	training	with	
al-Qaeda,	or	taking	positions	with	enemy	forces.”).
122.	See 10	U.S.C.A.	§	948c	(2009)	(limiting	jurisdiction	to	“alien[s]”).
123.	See	Glazier,	supra note	10	(noting	that	British	pressure	led	to	the	release	of	several	Brits	set	for	
trial	in	a	commission);	id. at	179–181	(noting	the	Australian	government’s	role	in	securing	a	gener-
ous	plea	agreement	for	David	Hicks).	
124.	See Cruickshank,	supra note	20.
125.	This	is	made	especially	difficult	by	the	difficulty	of	distinguishing	between	Al	Qaeda	and	other	
terrorist	organizations.	See Byman,	supra note	19.	Byman	argues	that	“what	makes	al-Qaida	so	
distinct	and	so	dangerous	is	that	it	tries	to	knit	[many]	different	strands	together.	It	backs	local	
causes	and,	as	it	does	so,	it	urges	the	groups	to	expand	their	horizons	to	embrace	al-Qaida’s	global	
agenda.	At	times,	some	of	these	local	groups,	such	as	al-Qaida	of	Iraq	or	al-Qaida	of	the	Islamic	
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IV. CrImInal ProCedure
Finally,	 terror	 suspects’	 rights	 before	 and	 during	Article	 III	 trials	
similarly	are	deteriorating	to	the	level	of	protections	afforded	in	mili-
tary	tribunals.	The	past	decade	has	seen	a	slow	degeneration	in	several	
key	areas	of	criminal	procedural	protections.	Among	the	many	adjust-
ments	Article	III	courts	have	made	to	accommodate	the	often	unortho-
dox	manner	in	which	terror	suspects	reach	the	court,	of	particular	note	
are	changes	in	Miranda	protections	and	pre-trial	evidence	standards.
Miranda rights,	perhaps	the	most	familiar	and	well-known	staple	of	
criminal	procedure,	recently	have	come	under	heavy	assault.	A	series	
of	 bills	 proposed	 by	 Congress	 and	 a	 decision	 handed	 down	 by	 the	
Supreme	 Court	 make	 Miranda’s	 continued	 viability	 dubious,	 at	 best.	
Furthermore,	the	Fourth	Circuit’s	review	of	a	recent	terror	trial	high-
lights	some	of	the	more	unorthodox	measures	Article	III	courts	have	
adopted	in	response	to	terror	trials.
a. mIranda Protections
On	May	1,	2010,	New	York	police	officers	foiled	a	much-publicized	
attempt	to	detonate	a	car	bomb	in	Times	Square.126	Within	hours,	police	
had	apprehended	and	charged	Faisal	Shahzad,	a	Pakistan	native	and	
United	States	citizen	purportedly	working	for	the	Pakistani	Taliban.127	
Maghreb,	have	formally	joined	al-Qaida;	at	times	cells	or	individuals	tied	to	groups	with	a	local	
focus	have	switched	allegiance	to	the	al-Qaida	core	or	provided	logistical	support	or	manpower	
for	an	al-Qaida	attack.	And	some	shift	over	 time:	Egypt’s	 Islamic	 Jihad	at	first	 focused	on	 the	
Mubarak	regime,	but	eventually	part	of	the	organization	split	and	became	the	core	of	al-Qaida.	
Making	this	even	more	complex,	after	area	regimes	crushed	Egypt’s	Jamaat	al-Islamiyya	and	the	
Libyan	Islamic	Fighting	Group,	some	individuals	from	these	organizations	simply	switched	alle-
giances	to	al-Qaida	and	adopted	its	global	orientation.	Id. Furthermore,	membership	in	Al	Qaeda	
does	not	necessarily	equate	with	actual	dangerousness.	See Del	Quentin	Wilber,	U.S. Can Continue 
to Detain Yemeni,	Wash. Post,	Dec.	15,	2009	at	A12	(“Musa’ab	Al-Madhwani	has	been	held	at	the	
facility	 since	 October	 2002	 on	 allegations	 that	 he	 was	 a	 member	 of	 al-Qaeda.	 Ruling	 from	 the	
bench,	U.S.	District	Judge	Thomas	F.	Hogan	said	that	the	government	had	met	its	burden	in	prov-
ing	the	accusations	but	that	he	did	not	think	Madhwani	was	dangerous.	‘There	is	nothing	in	the	
record	now	that	he	poses	any	greater	threat	than	those	detainees	who	have	already	been	released,’	
the	judge	said,	noting	that	Madhwani	has	been	a	model	prisoner	over	the	past	seven	years.”).
126.	See, e.g.,	Al	Baker	&	William	K.	Rashbaum,	Car Bomb Leads to Evacuation in Times Square,	N.Y. 
Times,	May	2,	2010,	at	A1.
127.	Specifically,	 Shahzad	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 connected	 with	 either	 Jaish-e-Mohammed,	 “an	 Al	
Qaeda-allied	Pakistani	militant	group,”	or	the	Tehrik-e-Taliban	Pakistan,	another	al-Qaeda-allied	
Pakistani	militant	group.	Alex	Rodriguez,	Bomb Plot Linked to Militants,	L.A. Times,	May	6,	2010,	at	
A18.	See Bobby	Ghosh,	From Pakistan to the World,	Time,	May	17,	2010,	at	25,	26–27.	Initial	theories	
about	who	might	have	engineered	the	attack	abounded,	and	included	conjectures	ranging	from	a	
group	of	Al-Qaeda	operatives	to	a	“homegrown	.	.	.	mentally	deranged	person	or	somebody	with	
a	political	agenda	that	doesn’t	like	the	[recently	passed]	healthcare	bill	or	something.”	Interview	
by	Katie	Couric	with	Michael	Bloomberg,	Mayor,	New	York	City,	CBS Evening News with Katie 
Couric	(CBS	television	broadcast	May	3,	2010)	(on	file	with	Brief).	See also	Sean	Gardiner	&	Sumathi	
Reddi,	Bomb Was Crude but Lethal,	Wall St. J.,	May	3,	2010, http://online/wsj.com/	article/SB10
001424052748704608104575220623841113164.html	(“[It	was]	most	likely	the	work	of	an	American	
or	expatriate	living	in	America	that	is	not	a	trained	member	of	a	terrorist	organization.”).
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In	 a	 particularly	 provocative	 response	 to	 this	 episode,	 Senator	 Joe	
Lieberman	proposed	legislation	that	would	strip	terror	suspects	of	U.S.	
citizenship	in	order	to	avoid	reading	them	Miranda	rights.128	The	pro-
posed	bill,	called	the	Terrorist	Expatriation	Act,	would	modify	existing	
provisions	for	revoking	U.S.	citizenship	by	adding	“providing	material	
support	or	resources	to	a	foreign	terrorist	organization”	to	the	 list	of	
citizenship-stripping	triggers.129
As	a	response	to	the	perceived	danger	of	having	to	read	Miranda	
warnings	 to	Shahzad,	 the	bill	 suffers	 from	three	glaring	errors.	First,	
Miranda	imposes	an	affirmative	duty	upon	law	enforcement	officers;	it	
does	not	grant	any	new	rights	to	suspects.130	A	suspect’s	status	or	clas-
sification	thus	would	have	no	impact	on	an	arresting	officer’s	duties.	
Second,	law	enforcement	officers	issue	Miranda	warnings	at	the	outset	
of	an	arrest,	long	before	the	officer	would	have	a	chance	to	determine	
whether	the	suspect	had	“provid[ed]	material	support	or	resources	to	
a	foreign	terrorist	organization,”131	and	before	the	process	required	to	
strip	 someone	 of	 his	 citizenship.132	 Third,	 even	 if	 the	 arresting	 agent	
could	discern	a	suspect’s	status,	the	proposed	bill	can	only	revoke	citi-
zenship	after	a	suspect	has	been	convicted	of	material	support,	seem-
ingly	undermining	the	entire	purpose	for	the	bill.133
Lieberman’s	fear	of	Miranda	rights,	as	expressed	through	his	pro-
posed	bill,	would	likely	create	more	problems	than	it	purports	to	solve.134	
128.	See Terrorist	Expatriation	Act,	H.R.	5237,	111th	Cong.	(2010).	See also Miranda	v.	Arizona,	384	
U.S.	436	 (1966);	Edward	Mason,	Brown, Lieberman Bill Would Strip Citizenship of Terror Suspects,	
Bos. Herald,	May	6,	2010,	http://www.bostonherald.com/news/us_politics/view.bg?articleid=	
1252976	(noting	initial	support	for	the	bill);	Sam	Stein,	Lieberman’s Citizenship-Revoking Bill Slammed 
as “Draconian”,	Huffington Post	(May	5,	2010),	http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/05/
liebermans-citizenship-re_n_564981.html	(criticizing	the	bill’s	paradoxical	proposals).
129.	H.R.	5237	§	2(1)(C);	see 8	U.S.C.	§	1481	(2006).
130.	Miranda,	384	U.S.	at	468–69.	As	Chief	Justice	Warren	explained,	“[S]uch	a	warning	is	an	absolute	
prerequisite	in	overcoming	the	inherent	pressures	of	the	interrogation	atmosphere.	.	.	.	The	Fifth	
Amendment	privilege	is	so	fundamental	to	our	system	of	constitutional	rule	and	the	expedient	of	
giving	an	adequate	warning	as	to	the	availability	of	the	privilege	so	simple,	we	will	not	pause	to	
inquire	in	individual	cases	whether	the	defendant	was	aware	of	his	rights	without	a	warning	be-
ing	given.	Assessments	of	the	knowledge	the	defendant	possessed,	based	on	information	as	to	his	
age,	education,	intelligence,	or	prior	contact	with	authorities,	can	never	be	more	than	speculation;	
a	warning	is	a	clear	cut	fact.	More	important,	whatever	the	background	of	the	person	interrogated,	
a	warning	at	the	time	of	the	interrogation	is	indispensable	to	overcome	its	pressures	and	to	insure	
that	the	individual	knows	he	is	free	to	exercise	the	privilege	at	that	point	in	time.”	Id. See also Sol	
Wachtler,	You Have the Right to Remain Constitutional,	N.Y. Times,	May	13,	2010,	at	A31	(“[C]ontrary	
to	common	belief,	the	Miranda	warning	doesn’t	confer	rights;	it	simply	reminds	arrestees	of	the	
rights	already	granted	to	them	by	the	Constitution.”).
131.	H.R.	5237	§	2(1)(C).
132.	See Afroyim	v.	Rusk,	387	U.S.	253,	268	(1967)	(holding	that	a	U.S.	citizen	cannot	be	deprived	of	
citizenship	involuntarily).
133.	H.R.	5237.
134.	See	 Stein,	 supra note	 128	 (“Indeed,	 what	 Lieberman	 is	 attempting	 to	 do	 is	 to	 pave	 the	 way	
for	terrorists	with	American	citizenship	to	be	thrown	into	military	tribunals	once	they	are	cap-
tured.”).	This	suggestion	seems	especially	likely	given	the	Supreme	Court’s	approval	of	a	“public	
safety”	exception	 to	Miranda	 if	 law	enforcement	officials	 feel	 compelled	 to	elicit	 time-sensitive	
information	 from	 a	 suspect	 immediately	 upon	 capture.	 See	 New	York	 v.	 Quarles,	 467	 U.S.	 649	
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As	increasing	numbers	of	would-be	terrorists	reveal	themselves	to	be	
American	citizens,135	 this	bill	attempts	 to	 remedy	 the	Miranda	“prob-
lem”	by	abandoning	the	criminal	justice	system	altogether	and	by	try-
ing	all	terrorists	in	military	tribunals.136	In	fact,	Congress	has	proposed	
ten	 bills	 to	 strengthen	 military	 tribunals	 during	 the	 111th	 Congress	
alone.	Three	bills	would	mandate	military	commission	 trials	 for	 cer-
tain	suspected	classes	of	terrorists.137	One	proposal	would	bar	any	pro-
ceeding,	including	a	military	tribunal,	from	taking	place	on	American	
soil	 (thereby	foreclosing	Article	 III	review	and	ensuring	a	 tribunal	at	
Guantánamo).138	 Three	 bills	 would	 strip	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice’s	
funding	 and	 permission	 to	 prosecute	 terrorists	 in	 Article	 III	 courts,	
and	a	fourth,	in	a	similar	vein,	would	require	the	President	to	secure	
approval	from	the	Secretaries	of	Defense	and	Homeland	Security	before	
prosecuting	a	terrorist	for	a	crime	in	an	Article	III	court.139	A	final	bill	
purports	to	give	the	President	unilateral	authority	to	determine	which	
detainees	were	subject	to	trial	by	tribunal.140
Neither	courts	nor	the	White	House	could	ignore	these	proposals	
to	 strip	Article	 III	 courts	 of	 jurisdiction	 and	 funding.	 In	 response	 to	
these	proposals,	 the	White	House	agreed	 to	work	on	 legislation	 that	
would	relax	Miranda	requirements,	a	position	diametrically	opposed	to	
the	one	it	announced	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	Times	Square	
(1984).	This	exception	was	invoked	with	Shahzad	as	well	as	with	Umar	Farouk	Abdulmutallab,	
the	so-called	Christmas	Day	Bomber.	See	Emily	Bazelon,	Miranda	Worked! The Bizarre Criticism of 
the Faisal Shahzad Interrogation,	Slate (May	5,	2010),	http://www.slate.com/id/2253056.	
135.	See, e.g.,	Ghosh,	supra	note	127	(listing	thirteen	U.S.	citizen	terrorists,	all	with	ties	to	Pakistan).
136.	See	Stein,	supra note	128.
137.	See	H.R.	4127,	111th	Cong.	(2009)	(“[A]lien	unprivileged	enemy	belligerents	may	only	be	tried	
by	military	commissions	if	tried	for	alleged	conduct	for	which	a	term	of	incarceration	or	the	death	
penalty	may	be	sought.”);	H.R.	4463,	111th	Cong.	(2010)	(requiring	“foreign	national[s]”	who	“en-
gage	.	.	.	in	conduct	constituting	an	offense	relating	to	a	terrorist	attack	against	persons	or	property	
in	the	United	States	or	against	any	United	States	Government	property	or	personnel	outside	the	
United	States;	and	[are]	subject	to	trial	for	that	offense	by	a	military	commission	.	.	.	be	tried	for	
that	offense	only	by	a	military	commission	 .	 .	 .	 .”);	H.R.	4588,	111th	Cong.	 (2010)	 (maintaining	
Guantánamo’s	existence	as	a	detention	center	indefinitely	and	mandating	that	persons	held	there	
be	tried	only	by	military	commission).	
138.	See H.R.	4738,	111th	Cong.	(2010)	(prohibiting	the	use	of	Department	of	Defense	installations	in	
the	United	States	for	the	prosecution	of	persons	charged	with	crimes	related	to	the	September	11	
attacks).
139.	See	H.R.	4111,	111th	Cong.	(2009)	(prohibiting	the	Department	of	Justice	from	prosecuting	any	
“unprivileged	 enemy	 combatant”);	 S.	 2977,	 111th	 Cong.	 (2010)	 (withdrawing	 Department	 of	
Justice	funding	for	any	prosecution	in	an	Article	III	court	of	persons	involved	in	the	September	
11	attacks);	H.R.	4556,	111th	Cong.	(2010)	(same);	Enemy	Belligerent	Interrogation,	Detention,	and	
Prosecution	Act	of	2010,	S.	3081,	111th	Cong.	§	4(a)	(2010)	(withdrawing	Department	of	Justice	
funding	 for	any	prosecution	 in	an	Article	 III	 court	of	aliens	determined	 to	be	an	unprivileged	
enemy	belligerent);	S.	2943,	111th	Cong.	(2010)	(requiring	the	Attorney	General	to	consult	with	
the	Secretaries	of	Defense	and	Homeland	Security	and	the	Director	of	National	Intelligence	before	
prosecuting	a	terrorist	in	an	Article	III	court).
140.	See	 H.R.	 4415,	 111th	 Cong.	 (2010)	 (granting	 the	 President	 the	 authority	 to	 determine	 which	
persons	are	subject	to	detention	or	military	commission	trial	as	unlawful	enemy	combatants).	
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incident.141	 Surprisingly,	 however,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 also	 modified	
its	 interpretation	 of	 Miranda	 protections	 in	 a	 way	 that	 may	 mollify	
Congress	but	that	comes	at	too	great	a	cost.
In	Berghuis v. Thompkins,142	the	Supreme	Court	responded	implicitly	
to	the	loudest	criticisms	of	the	law	enforcement	response	to	the	Times	
Square	bomber.	In	Berghuis,	police	questioned	an	unresponsive	suspect	
for	three	hours.	After	remaining	silent	during	the	investigators’	mono-
logues,	the	suspect	finally	relented	to	the	interrogation	by	answering	
“yes”	 to	a	question	about	whether	he	prayed	 for	 forgiveness	 for	 the	
crime.143	 The	 5–4	 opinion,	 written	 by	 Justice	 Kennedy,	 paradoxically	
concludes	that	Thompkins	should	have	broken	his	silence	if	he	wished	
to	invoke	his	right	to	silence.144	A	suspect	must	thus	speak	to	acknowl-
edge	his	desire	not	to.	The	opinion	goes	on	to	establish	that,	if	a	suspect	
has	maintained	silence	for	several	hours	and	then	speaks	but	does	not	
use	that	speech	to	declare	his	intent	to	stay	silent,	police	may	construe	
that	action	as	a	waiver	of	the	right	to	remain	silent.145
As	a	threshold	matter,	it	is	unclear	why	so	many	are	so	concerned	
about	the	“dangers”	posed	by	protecting	Miranda	rights.146	Moreover,	
although	the	Berghuis	ruling	does	not	specifically	or	especially	impact	
terror	suspects,	it	reflects	the	public	sentiment	that	Miranda	warnings	
are	making	America	 less	safe.	 In	 the	past	months,	all	 three	branches	
of	 the	 federal	 government	 have	 acted	 substantially	 to	 curb	 Miranda	
rights:	Congress	and	the	White	House,	plainly	responding	to	perceived	
terror	threats,	acted	first.	The	Supreme	Court,	although	not	explicit	in	
its	rationale,	followed	suit.	While	it	 is	far	from	dispositive	proof	that	
Article	 III	 courts	 have	 begun	 responding	 to	 congressional	 pressure	
141.	Compare	White House Press Briefing with Press Secretary Robert Gibbs	(C-SPAN	television	broad-
cast	May	6,	2010)	(noting	that	Lieberman’s	proposal	lacked	any	support	within	the	White	House),	
with Pete	Yost,	‘Modifying’ Miranda Modifies the Political Debate,	Huffington Post	(May	20,	2010),	
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/20/modifying-miranda-rights_n_583000.html	
(“Attorney	General	Eric	Holder	and	the	rest	of	the	Obama	administration	are	suddenly	playing	
offense,	offering	to	work	with	Congress	on	a	law	that	would	let	law	enforcement	delay	constitu-
tional	Miranda	warnings	to	terror	suspects.”).
142.	Berghuis	v.	Thompkins,	2010	S.	Ct.	WL	2160784	*1	(U.S.	June	1,	2010).
143.	See id. at	*1.
144.	See id.
145.	See id.
146.	See Wachtler,	 supra note	 130	 (“[M]any	 supporters	 of	 Miranda	 exclusions	 argue	 that	 the	 rule	
hamstrings	 law	enforcement.	This	 is	wrong.”).	 Judge	Wachtler	 explains	 that	 “it’s	 important	 to	
note	how	little	most	people	understand	what	Miranda	does	and	doesn’t	mean.	First	and	foremost,	
the	failure	to	give	a	Miranda	warning	does	not	result	in	a	case	being	dismissed.	It	only	results	in	
the	inability	of	the	police	to	use	a	confession	and	its	fruits	in	evidence.	Indeed,	the	overwhelming	
majority	of	successful	criminal	prosecutions	do	not	involve	confessions.	.	.	.	[T]alk-show	hosts	and	
television	police	dramas	have	led	people	to	believe	that	before	the	police	may	interrogate	or	arrest	
a	suspect,	the	Miranda	warning	must	be	given.	That	just	isn’t	the	case.	Neither	arrest	alone	nor	
interrogation	alone	(if	there	has	been	no	arrest)	requires	the	warning	to	be	given.	Miranda	applies	
only	to	in-custody	questioning;	a	statement	made	to	the	police	by	a	suspect	not	in	custody	is	not	
subject	to	Miranda.	Id.
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regarding	America’s	 counterterrorism	efforts,	Berghuis is,	 at	 the	very	
least,	part	of	a	 larger	 trend	which	points	 toward	 the	conclusion	 that	
Article	III	courts	are	not	immune	to	the	corrosive	effects	of	an	ongoing	
war	against	terrorism.
B. Tribunal Procedures in Federal courTs
The	 recent	 trial	 of	Abu	Ali	 highlights	 this	 trend	 of	 relaxing	 pro-
cedural	 standards	 in	 the	 face	 of	 terrorism.	Ahmed	 Omar	Abu	Ali,	 a	
United	States	citizen,	was	arrested	in	Saudi	Arabia	in	early	2003	in	con-
nection	with	the	May	12,	2003,	Riyadh	bombing.147	Held	by	Saudi	offi-
cials,	Abu	Ali	claims	to	have	been	tortured,	describing	his	experience	
that	month	as	“very	intense.”148	Eventually,	Abu	Ali	was	transferred	to	
the	United	States	for	trial.149	Once	in	America,	the	government	charged	
Abu	Ali	with	nine	separate	terror	offenses.150
In	bringing	Abu	Ali	to	trial,	the	government	was	faced	with	several	
evidentiary	and	procedural	challenges	that	led	to	a	fairly	unorthodox	
trial.	Specifically,	the	government	sought	(a)	to	tweak	Abu	Ali’s	Miranda	
rights;	 (b)	 to	 introduce	 deposition	 testimony	 of	 Saudi	 officials	 taken	
outside	of	the	defendant’s	presence;	and	(c)	to	use	classified	informa-
tion	to	convict	Abu	Ali	that	he	would	not	be	allowed	to	view.	The	cir-
cuit	court	on	review,	however,	found	these	deviations	from	standard	
procedure	“harmless.”151	As	Professor	Vladeck	has	noted,	these	devia-
tions	“demonstrate[]	 the	flexibility	 that	 federal	courts	can	exercise	 in	
these	cases	and	the	potential	dangers	lurking	in	the	background	for	the	
rights	of	defendants.”152
First,	 the	government	sought	 to	marginalize	Abu	Ali’s	objections	
to	 the	 admission	 of	 interrogation	 testimony	 taken	 without	 his	 hav-
ing	been	given	Miranda	warnings.153	When	Abu	Ali	had	initially	been	
captured	and	interrogated	by	Saudi	law	enforcement	officials,	FBI	and	
Secret	Service	agents	were	present	for	much	of	the	interrogation	and,	at	
times,	crafted	the	questions	they	wanted	the	Saudis	to	ask	of	Abu	Ali.154	
147.	See United	States	v.	Abu	Ali,	395	F.	Supp.	2d	338,	343-44	(E.D.	Va.	2005);	see also United	States	v.	
Abu	Ali,	528	F.3d	210,	221-26	(4th	Cir.	2008),	cert. denied,	129	S.	Ct.	1312	(2009);	Stephen	I.	Vladeck,	
Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts After Abu	Ali,	88 Tex. L. Rev.	1501	(2010).
148.	Abu Ali,	395	F.	Supp.	2d	at	369.
149.	Abu Ali,	528	F.3d	at	225.
150.	See Vladeck,	supra	note	147.
151.	See Abu Ali,	528	F.3d	at	257.
152.	Vladeck,	supra	note	147.
153.	See Abu Ali,	395	F.	Supp.	2d	at	381–83.
154.	Id. at	349,	382	(noting	that	the	Saudi	interrogators	asked	six	of	the	thirteen	questions	the	FBI	and	
Secret	Service	agents	sought	Abuto	be	asked	of	Abu	Ali).
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Under	what	is	known	as	the	“joint	venture”	doctrine,155	a	defendant’s	
statements	 made	 during	 a	 foreign-agent-administered	 interrogation	
must	be	suppressed	if	United	States	officials	are	involved	in	the	ques-
tioning	and	did	not	give	Miranda	warnings.	Nevertheless,	the	district	
court	held	that	the	United	States	officials’	presence	and	assistance	did	
not	constitute	a	“joint	venture”	requiring	Miranda	warnings,	nor	did	
the	Saudi	interrogators	act	at	the	behest	of	the	United	States	agents.156	
The	Fourth	Circuit	affirmed	by	noting	that	the	American	officials	pres-
ent	did	not	intend	to	“evade”	Miranda,157	echoing	the	Al Maqaleh court’s	
conjectures	about	the	government’s	intentions.158	Thus,	Abu	Ali’s	seem-
ingly	inadmissible	statements	made	without	Miranda warnings,	under	
the	duress	of	torture,	in	the	presence	of	American	authorities,	and	in	
response	 to	American-authored	questions	were	nevertheless	allowed	
into	evidence.159
Second,	the	government	attempted	to	overcome	the	requirements	
of	Rule	15	of	the	Federal	Rules	of	Criminal	Procedure,	which	mandates	
that	a	defendant	who	is	“in	custody”	be	present	at	a	witness’s	deposi-
tion.160	In	Abu	Ali’s	case,	the	government	sought	to	introduce	deposi-
tion	 testimony	 of	 Saudi	 government	 officials	 sitting	 in	 Saudi	Arabia	
outside	Abu	Ali’s	physical	presence.	As	 the	Fourth	Circuit	 reasoned,	
getting	the	Saudi	officials	to	America	would	be	too	difficult,	and	trans-
porting	Abu	Ali	to	Saudi	Arabia	to	be	present	at	the	deposition	would	
be	“impractical.”161	As	a	novel	solution,	the	district	court	judge	directed	
that	two	government	attorneys	and	two	of	Abu	Ali’s	defense	attorneys	
attend	the	deposition	in	Saudi	Arabia	while	Abu	Ali	remained	in	cus-
tody	in	America	with	another	defense	attorney.162	These	two	separate	
camps	were	connected	via	video	chat	technology,	allowing	the	Saudi	
officials	 and	Abu	Ali	 to	 see	 and	 hear	 one	 another	 simultaneously.163	
Finally,	the	judge	watched	from	yet	a	third	location	to	preside	over	the	
depositions	and	rule	on	objections.164	The	Fourth	Circuit	approved	these
155.	See e.g.,	United	States	v.	Yousef,	327	F.3d	56,	145–46	(2d	Cir.	2003)	(mandating	that	a	defendant’s	
statements	made	during	interrogation	by	foreign	agents	must	be	suppressed	if	United	States	of-
ficials	are	involved	in	the	questioning).
156.	Abu Ali,	395	F.	Supp.	2d	at	381.
157.	See United	States	v.	Abu	Ali,	528	F.3d	210,	230	n.5	(4th	Cir.	2008),	cert. denied,	129	S.	Ct.	1312	
(2009).
158.	See discussion	supra notes	77–78	and	accompanying	text.
159.	In	fact,	only	one	member	of	the	Fourth	Circuit	panel	took	umbrage	at	this	apparent	circumven-
tion	of	Miranda.	See Abu Ali,	528	F.3d	at	230–31	n.6	(explaining	that	Judge	Motz	would	hold	that	
the	interrogation	was	a	joint	venture).	Judge	Motz’s	dissent,	however,	was	purely	theoretical:	she	
joined	the	court’s	reasoning	that	any	error	was	harmless	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	and	dissented	
solely	on	the	issue	of	sentencing.	Id. at	269.
160.	Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(c)(1).
161.	Abu Ali,	528	F.3d	at	239.
162.	Id.
163.	Id.
164.	Id. at	239–40.
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unorthodox	deposition	procedures	as	meeting	the	standard	announced	
in	Maryland v. Craig.165	Craig	requires	that	deposition	testimony	taken	
outside	a	defendant’s	presence	be	“necessary	to	further	public	policy”	
and	that	its	reliability	be	“otherwise	assured.”166	First,	the	court	found	
that	the	elaborate	procedures	used	by	the	district	court	assured	the	tes-
timony’s	reliability.167	Second	—	and	more	tellingly	—	the	court	found	
that	 prosecuting	 “those	 bent	 on	 inflicting	 mass	 civilian	 casualties	 or	
assassinating	 high	 public	 officials”	 is,	 in	 itself,	 an	 “important	 public	
interest.”168	 The	 Fourth	 Circuit	 explicitly	 endorsed	 this	 ends-over-
means	analysis,	saying	conclusively	that	enforcing	the	requirement	for	
the	defendant	to	be	present	at	a	deposition	would	preclude	the	govern-
ment	from	using	“important	testimony.”169
Finally,	the	government	sought	to	admit	classified	evidence	against	
Abu	 Ali	 at	 trial	 under	 the	 Classified	 Information	 Procedures	 Act	
(“CIPA”).170	To	do	so,	 the	district	 court	permitted	 the	government	 to	
employ	the	“silent	witness”	method	of	testimony,	in	which	jurors	and	a	
witness	both	refer	to	the	same	classified	document	in	response	to	ques-
tioning	rather	than	speaking	the	answers	aloud.	This	procedure	avoids	
making	the	underlying	information	public.	Abu	Ali	himself,	however,	
would	only	be	able	to	see	a	heavily	redacted	version	of	the	documents	
being	used	against	him.171	Moreover,	Abu	Ali’s	defense	counsel,	who	
lacked	security	clearance,	was	not	permitted	to	question	the	govern-
ment	 witnesses	 that	 would	 introduce	 this	 classified	 information.172	
On	 review,	 the	 Fourth	 Circuit	 agreed	 unanimously	 that	 this	 process	
violated	Abu	Ali’s	Confrontation	Clause	rights.173	Nevertheless,	much	
like	its	review	of	the	Miranda	violations,	the	Fourth	Circuit	found	this	
Confrontation	Clause	violation	to	be	merely	harmless	error.174	The	trial	
court’s	abuse	of	CIPA	was	thus	relegated	to	nothing	more	than	a	harm-
less	mistake.
Abu Ali	 presents	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 a	 district	 court,	 faced	 with	
the	 complexities	 of	 a	 terror	 trial,	 deviated	 significantly	 from	 estab-
lished	 criminal	 procedural	 protections	 to	 accommodate	 the	 govern-
ment’s	interests.	As	Professor	Vladeck	notes,	the	Abu Ali	trial	“proves	
that	every	case	raises	its	own	unique	set	of	practical,	procedural,	and	
substantive	challenges.	“But	 .	 .	 .	where	unique	national	security	con-
cerns	are	implicated,	Abu Ali suggests	that	courts	will attempt	to	reach	
165.	497	U.S.	836	(1990).
166.	Abu Ali,	528	F.3d	at	240–42	(quoting	Craig,	497	U.S.	at	850).
167.	See id. at	241–42.
168.	Id. at	241.
169.	Id.
170.	See id. at	249;	see also 18	U.S.C.	app.	§§	1–16	(Classified	Information	Procedures	Act).
171.	Abu Ali,	528	F.3d	at	250	&	n.18.
172.	Id. at	250–51.
173.	Id. at	255.
174.	Id. at	257.
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accommodations	 that	 take	 into	 account	 .	 .	 .	 the	 Government’s	 inter-
est”	along	with	 the	defendant’s.175	 Indeed,	when	viewed	as	a	whole,	
Abu	Ali’s	 trial	 resulted	 in	 the	admission	of	coerced	statements,	non-
confrontational	deposition	testimony,	and	secret	evidence	that	neither	
Abu	Ali	nor	his	defense	counsel	were	permitted	to	review.
These	errors,	two	of	which	members	of	the	Fourth	Circuit	thought	
unconstitutional,	were	subsequently	deemed	harmless.	The	trial	court	
bends,	and	the	reviewing	court	approves.	While	one	cannot	extrapolate	
Abu Ali to	apply	to	all	terrorism	cases,	it	is	this	trend	that	should	give	
pause	to	those	advocating	for	Article	III	terror	trials.	For,	upon	closer	
examination,	 these	measures	come	troublingly	close	to	 those	used	in	
military	 tribunals.	 The	 relaxed	 Miranda	 requirements,176	 the	 weigh-
ing	of	 the	government’s	 interest	 in	admitting	otherwise	 inadmissible	
deposition	evidence,177	and	the	government’s	unwillingness	to	disclose	
inculpatory	information	far	above	what	CIPA	protects	are	all	consistent	
with	military	commission	regulations.178	Although	the	procedures	that	
the	district	court	adopted	may	have	caused	no	“harm”	to	Abu	Ali,	 it	
is	hard	to	see	how	approving	methods	that	are	equivalent	to	military	
commission	regulations	is	anything	but	harmful	to	Article	III	courts.
V. ConClusion
The	pressure	to	convict	“dangerous”	terrorists	against	a	backdrop	
of	a	decade-long	war	has	taken	its	toll	on	the	federal	courts.	Rather	than	
vindicating	the	accused’s	constitutional	rights	in	all	circumstances,	the	
federal	 courts	have	 too	often	become	complicit	 in	distorting	 them.179	
Federal	courts	have	begun	to	resemble	the	military	tribunal	system	that	
was	once	defined	by	how	distinct	it	was	from	the	Article	III	system.	The	
past	decade	has	seen	federal	courts’	power	to	review	executive	deten-
tion	heavily	circumscribed.	Federal	prisons	have	begun	to	approximate	
175.	See Vladeck,	supra	note	147.
176.	See 10	U.S.C.	§	949a(b)(2)–(3)	(noting	that	evidence	should	not	be	excluded	on	self-incrimina-
tion	or	coercion	grounds	except	under	certain	narrow	circumstances).
177.	See 10	U.S.C.	§	949a	(noting	that	the	tribunal	court	may	weigh	the	probative	value	of	otherwise	
inadmissible	evidence).
178.	See 10	U.S.C.A.	§	949p-1	to	949p-7	(West	2010)	(providing	that	the	government	cannot	be	com-
pelled	to	disclose	classified	information	to	anyone	not	authorized	to	receive	it).
179.	For	example,	in	late	April,	2010,	trial	was	set	to	open	in	the	case	of	Syed	Fahad	Hashimi,	an	
American	citizen	born	abroad	and	educated	in	New	York.	The	government’s	handling	of	its	case	
against	 Hashimi	 highlighted	 many	 of	 the	 dangers	 of	 terror	 trials,	 including	 the	 government’s	
success	in	restricting	access	to	potentially	damaging	state	secrets.	See Jeanne	Theoharris,	The Legal 
Black Hole in Southern Manhattan,	Slate	(Apr.	27,	2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2252117/page-
num/all/#p2.	Hashimi,	however,	pleaded	guilty	to	conspiracy	to	provide	material	support	short-
ly	before	trial,	precluding	an	actual	trial.	See Press	Release,	U.S.	Attorney	for	the	S.	Dist.	of	N.Y.,	
U.S.	Citizen	Pleads	Guilty	in	Manhattan	Fed.	Court	to	Conspiring	to	Provide	Material	Support	to	
Al	Qaeda	(Apr.	27,	2010)	(on	file	with	author).
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V. ConClusion
The	pressure	to	convict	“dangerous”	terrorists	against	a	backdrop	
of	a	decade-long	war	has	taken	its	toll	on	the	federal	courts.	Rather	than	
vindicating	the	accused’s	constitutional	rights	in	all	circumstances,	the	
federal	 courts	have	 too	often	become	complicit	 in	distorting	 them.179	
Federal	courts	have	begun	to	resemble	the	military	tribunal	system	that	
was	once	defined	by	how	distinct	it	was	from	the	Article	III	system.	The	
past	decade	has	seen	federal	courts’	power	to	review	executive	deten-
tion	heavily	circumscribed.	Federal	prisons	have	begun	to	approximate	
Guantánamo	 Bay’s	 indefinite	 detention	 regime,	 and	 federal	 criminal	
trial	proceedings	of	terrorists	at	times	bear	an	eerie	resemblance	to	mili-
tary	commission	norms.
As	 much	 as	 one	 may	 endorse	 the	 apparent	 move	 from	 military	
commissions	to	federal	courts,	that	move	should	be	rejected	if	it	comes	
at	 the	cost	of	scarring	the	Article	 III	system.	Therefore,	both	those	 in	
favor	of	military	commissions	and	those	in	favor	of	federal	court	tri-
als	should	pause.	Regardless	of	whether	 it	may	be	desirable	 that	 the	
criminal	 justice	 system	 has	 the	 flexibility	 to	 adjust	 to	 these	 wartime	
conditions,	these	developments	have	eviscerated	the	largest	disparities	
between	the	tribunal	and	criminal	spheres.	Even	persons	in	favor	of	a	
separate	judicial	system	in	the	form	of	tribunals	no	longer	have	much	
justification	for	such	a	proposal.
179.	For	example,	in	late	April,	2010,	trial	was	set	to	open	in	the	case	of	Syed	Fahad	Hashimi,	an	
American	citizen	born	abroad	and	educated	in	New	York.	The	government’s	handling	of	its	case	
against	 Hashimi	 highlighted	 many	 of	 the	 dangers	 of	 terror	 trials,	 including	 the	 government’s	
success	in	restricting	access	to	potentially	damaging	state	secrets.	See Jeanne	Theoharris,	The Legal 
Black Hole in Southern Manhattan,	Slate	(Apr.	27,	2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2252117/page-
num/all/#p2.	Hashimi,	however,	pleaded	guilty	to	conspiracy	to	provide	material	support	short-
ly	before	trial,	precluding	an	actual	trial.	See Press	Release,	U.S.	Attorney	for	the	S.	Dist.	of	N.Y.,	
U.S.	Citizen	Pleads	Guilty	in	Manhattan	Fed.	Court	to	Conspiring	to	Provide	Material	Support	to	
Al	Qaeda	(Apr.	27,	2010)	(on	file	with	author).
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Wars	invariably	have	a	corrosive	effect	on	democratic	institutions.180	
Courts	are	no	different.	Perhaps,	as	some	have	suggested,	the	solution	
would	be	to	remove	courts	from	the	fast-paced	business	of	trying	terror	
with	a	common	law	process.181	However,	that	solution	is	too	simplistic.	
It	is	apparent	that,	no	matter	where	terrorists	are	tried,	our	societal	fear	
of	the	threat	they	pose	has	led	us	to	create	mirror-image	systems	that	
tend	 toward	 kangaroo	 courts,	 state	 secrets,	 prolonged	 interrogation,	
and	indefinite	detention.	Until	we	confront	and	deal	with	this	inclina-
tion,	any	system	in	which	we	try	terrorists	is	doomed	to	repeat	these	
errors.
180.	For	example,	in	April,	2010,	to	mixed	public	reaction,	President	Obama	authorized	the	assassi-
nation	of	an	American	citizen,	Anwar	al-Awlaki,	based	solely	on	his	suspected	involvement	with	
al-Qaeda.	See Alex	Rodriguez	&	David	Zucchino,	U.S. Drones Leave a Trail of Discord,	L.A. Times,	
May	2,	2010,	at	A1	(discussing	State	Department	legal	advisor	Harold	Koh’s	approval	of	the	pro-
gram	despite	severe	disagreement	among	military	and	intelligence	personnel	regarding	the	tar-
geted	killing	program);	Scott	Shane,	U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of Radical Muslim Cleric Tied to 
Domestic Terror Suspects,	N.Y. Times,	Apr.	7,	2010,	at	A12	(noting	that	“[p]eople	on	the	target	list	
are	considered	to	be	military	enemies	of	the	United	States	and	therefore	not	subject	to	the	ban	on	
political	assassination	first	approved	by	President	Gerald	R.	Ford,”	and	that	Representative	Jane	
Harman,	Chairwoman	of	a	House	subcommittee	on	homeland	security,	described	Awlaki	as	“the	
person,	the	terrorist,	who	would	be	terrorist	No.	1	in	terms	of	threat	against	us”).	Quoting	an	un-
named	White	House	official,	Shane	notes	that	“[t]he	United	States	works,	exactly	as	the	American	
people	expect,	to	overcome	threats	to	their	security,	and	this	individual	—	through	his	own	ac-
tions	—	has	become	one.	Awlaki	knows	what	he’s	done,	and	he	knows	he	won’t	be	met	with	
handshakes	and	flowers.	None	of	this	should	surprise	anyone.”	Id. The	Administration’s	recent	
support	for	such	a	program	belies	previously	held	beliefs	that	targeted	killing	would	be	categori-
cally	unlawful.	Merely	five	years	before	the	official	announcement	of	the	program,	Professor	(and	
later	President	Obama’s	OIRA	Director)	Cass	Sunstein	had	written	hypothetically	of	exactly	such	
an	executive	action	and	declared	it	unthinkable	under	any	legal	framework.	See	Cass	R.	Sunstein,	
Administrative Law Goes to War,	118	Harv. L. Rev. 2663,	2663,	2664	(2005).	Sustein	opined	that,	“[t]
he	President	may	use	‘all	necessary	and	appropriate	force.’	An	execution	of	someone	who	can	be	
detained	instead	is	gratuitous;	it	is	neither	‘necessary’	nor	‘appropriate.’”	Id.	at	2668.	
181.	See Jack	Goldsmith	&	Benjamin	Wittes,	A Role Judges Should Not Have to Play,	Wash. Post, Dec.	
22,	2009	(noting	the	exasperation	of	Judge	Thomas	F.	Hogan	of	U.S.	District	Court	in	Washington,	
D.C.	with	the	number	and	complexity	of	detainee	and	terror	cases,	who	claimed	that	“different	
rules	of	evidence”	and	“a	difference	 in	substantive	 law”	in	federal	courts	“highlights	the	need	
for	a	national	 legislative	solution	with	the	assistance	of	the	Executive	so	that	these	matters	are	
handled	promptly	and	uniformly	and	fairly	for	all	concerned.”).	Goldsmith	and	Wittes	claim	a	
dire	need	for	courts	to	get	out	of	the	business	of	“writing”	terror	policies,	and	insist	that	Congress	
should	“offer	a	clear	definition	of	who	can	be	detained,	a	coherent	set	of	evidentiary	and	proce-
dural	rules	to	determine	who	fits	the	definition	of	an	enemy,	and	guidance	concerning	the	scope	
of	the	government’s	obligation	to	disclose	evidence	to	detainees’	lawyers.”	Id.
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